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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN
UNION AMONG TURKISH YOUTH: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
MUSTAFA ERDEM KUŞDİL
European Studies M.A. THESIS, July 2019
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Mert Moral
Keywords: Implicit association test (IAT), the EU-Turkey relationship, voting
behavior, social identity theory, system justification theory
Turkish public opinion on EU is a relatively under-studied area in political science
literature. To understand the dynamics behind the attitudes towards the EU, this
study applies to implicit association test (IAT) and explicit survey measures, and
two social psychological theories of inter-group relations, namely social identity, and
system justification theories. The recent literature has shown that implicit attitudes
can contribute to our understanding of vote choice (see Iyengar and Westwood 2015;
Raccuia 2016; Ryan 2017). Employing data from a sample of 247 participants from
three universities and the youth branches of the four major Turkish political parties,
the study compares the strengths of explicit and implicit attitudes on a hypothetical
membership referendum to the EU. The findings suggest that the Turkish national
identity occupies a pivotal place in shaping the perceptions and preferences of the
Turkish youth toward the EU. In the logistic regression analysis, the explicit EU
attitudes predict vote choices on the hypothetical referendum better than any other
variable. Even though it shows significant correlations with self-report EU measures,
the predictive value of the implicit EU attitudes on voting behavior is not as strong
as hypothesized. Nonetheless, in the OLS regression analysis, implicit measures are
statistically significant in explaining the legitimacy of the system boundaries between
the EU and Turkey. These findings are discussed in relation to their importance in
understanding the complex nature of Turkish public opinion on the issue of the
EU-Turkey relations and other political preferences.
iv
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE GENÇLİĞİ ARASINDA AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE OLAN DESTEĞİN
DİNAMİKLERİNİ ANLAMAK: ÖRTÜK TUTUMLARIN ÖNEMİNE DAİR BİR
İNCELEME
MUSTAFA ERDEM KUŞDIL
AVRUPA ÇALIŞMALARI YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Mert Moral
Anahtar Kelimeler: Örtük çağrışım testi (ÖÇT), Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, oy verme
davranışı, sosyal kimlik teorisi, sistemi meşrulaştırma teorisi
Siyaset bilimi literatüründe, Türkiye kamuoyunun Avrupa Birliği’ne yönelik tutum
araştırmalarının az sayıda olduğu ve sınırlı dinamikleri ele aldıkları görülmektedir.
Bu çalışmada, AB’ye yönelik tutumlar sosyal kimlik ve sistemi meşrulaştırma kuram-
ları çerçevesinde, örtük çağrışım testi (ÖÇT) ve anket ölçüm yöntemleri kullanılarak
ele alınmaktadır. Önceki çalışmalar, örtük tutumların oy verme davranışını açıkla-
mada faydalı olabildiğini göstermiştir (bknz. Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Raccuia
2016; Ryan 2017). Bu çalışmada, üç farklı üniversitenin öğrencilerinden ve dört siyasi
partinin gençlik kollarından oluşan 247 kişilik bir örneklem ile, açık ve örtük tutum-
ların Türkiye’de AB’ye yönelik yapılabilecek (varsayımsal) bir üyelik referandumunu
açıklamadaki rolleri karşılaştırılmaktadır. Ampirik analizler, Türkiye gençliğinin
AB’ye yönelik tutum ve algılarında Türk milli kimliğinin merkezi bir rol oynadığını
göstermektedir. Lojistik regresyon analizinde, AB’ye yönelik açık tutumlar, katılım-
cıların referandumdaki oy verme davranışını diğer değişkenlerden daha başarılı şek-
ilde açıklayabilmektedir. Öte yandan, diğer açık tutum ölçekleriyle anlamlı kore-
lasyonlar göstermesine rağmen, örtük tutumların oy verme davranışını varsayılan
düzeyde açıklayamadığı ortaya konulmuştur. Diğer analizlerde, örtük ölçümlerin
AB ve Türkiye arasındaki sistem sınırlarının meşruiyetine yönelik algıları anlamlı
şekilde açıkladığı görülmektedir. Tüm bu kuramsal beklentiler ve ampirik bulgular,
kamuoyunun süregelen Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine ve çeşitli siyasi tercihlerine yönelik
karmaşık algılarını anlayabilmek adına sırasıyla tartışılmaktadır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Turkey’s relationship with the EU has always been an interesting subject for political
scientists. One of the salient features of the rich literature on the EU-Turkey’s
relations is its explicit focus on macro-level state relations and the cultural and/or
sociological challenges that a future membership would bring. Though it would be
harsh to criticize this set of studies for their macro-level approach, it is obvious that
these challenges cannot be isolated from the micro-level dynamics of the societies
involved. Several scholars have pointed out that the success of the EU project
depends on the acceptance of the people of the countries involved in the Union
who are both the target and the foundation of the whole process. This European
project is unprecedented in terms of its ambitions and scale regarding the lives of
large numbers of individuals. However, these features of this project can be seen
as the soft spot of it: without the support of people, it is bound to dissolve in the
long run. As known, public opinion is the basis of decision-making mechanisms
in democratic countries. In every democracy, public opinion possesses the power
of forcing any government to take or abolish some policy decisions. Therefore, it
becomes essential for the EU and respective policymakers to be knowledgeable about
the trends in public opinion in member and the candidate societies, a necessity that
has been faced by the EU itself by realizing regular public opinion research such as
Eurobarometer.
Although no one can deny that we have learned a lot from macro-level studies,
it would also be difficult to ignore that such studies have not helped explain why
the support to the EU project is so changeable and very sensitive to some social,
political, and economic developments. There are some easily discernible patterns
of stability in public opinion as well as the patterns of changes over the years. To
understand the dynamics behind these complex patterns of public opinion, the levels
of analysis should also include the individual as well as the macro factors. Therefore,
we believe that any attempt at to understand the support to the EU has to utilize
the psychological explanations regarding the attitudes.
Political psychology is one of the disciplines that have proposed such explanations of
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attitude formation and attitude change. However, the conceptual and methodologi-
cal problems prevented the disciplines from reaching a consensus on how to measure
attitudes. The attitude-behavior relationship is at top of the list of the topics that
have been debated by the scholars starting from the 60s. Over the years, it has been
seen that some behaviors, irrespective of what they entail, are difficult to predict by
using attitudes. For some scholars, one reason for this difficulty could be the peo-
ple’s unwillingness to report their real opinions through self-reports or simply giving
distorted responses as they think doing so is socially desirable. These problems led
political scientists to find ways of enhancing their ability to predict and capture
accurate opinions by focusing on the measurement of implicit attitudes. Therefore,
the doubt that the explicitly reported opinions and attitudes measured by conven-
tional survey methods may not be the only way of exploring how people develop and
change their attitudes has led some scholars to search for alternative techniques of
attitude measurement. Consequently, the concept of implicit attitudes has started
to attract attention in this area. As any advancement in the area of attitude mea-
surement has been utilized by scholars of other social sciences, a similar interest has
recently started to grow in political science as well.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is one of the most prominent instruments that
have been developed in the current line of research of attitudes. Some scholars be-
lieve that the technique could be effective in capturing the latent factors behind
the behavioral outcomes that may be related to attitudes. The IAT is expected to
show the relative strength of an individual’s association through response latency.
This helps researchers to control the social desirability effect in biases that come
with in-group favoritism. Because of the automated nature of the measure, individ-
uals’ cognitive control over the formation of the association is assumed as minimal.
As Burdein, Lodge and Taber (Burdein, Lodge, and Taber 2006, 359) have put it,
this “enables us to measure some of the automatic and effective responses and pre-
dispositions that influence thoughts and behaviors outside of conscious awareness.”
However, the importance of subconscious processing and its effectiveness in predict-
ing people’s political behavior has been incorporated into the empirical research to
a minimal extent in the relevant literature. Although some studies are utilizing the
implicit attitude measurement in predicting the political behaviors, the use of this
new technique is still scarce in public opinion research on the EU. In the literature on
EU-Turkey relations, no study employed such a technique yet. As empirical studies
in Turkey focus mostly on the descriptive analyses of determinants of support or
disapproval with the EU (see Kentmen 2008; Yılmaz 2002; Çarkoğlu 2014; Şenyuva
2014), any attempt at handling the issue concerning latent factors gains additional
importance. Given the pivotal place of the identity issues in the context of the EU-
2
Turkey relationships, discovering the latent factors that shape the Turkish public
opinion can be seen as a valuable attempt.
In this thesis, I draw upon the suggestions that implicit attitudes have the potential
to be useful in the prediction of voting behavior (Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008;
Roccato and Zogmaister 2010). It is important to emphasize that these studies often
point towards an effect on specific political issues rather than political elections
(Raccuia 2016). The EU-Turkey relations present an ideal case by which we can
hypothetically put the Turkish public in a situation to assess their opinions about
the future of the relations in a potential referendum.
Often, people do not indicate nor reveal their true motives or intentions directly.
When it comes to concepts related to political associations such as voting, they espe-
cially shy away from presenting their true attitudes (and behavior). This results in
opinions reported as undecided or indifferent. Independent from their unwillingness
to respond, these types of individuals represent an important part of the samples
employed to examine political behavior. Gathering these types of information and
most importantly investigating new ways to improve the accuracy of individuals’
responses to questions of political nature has always been an essential part of po-
litical research. Recently, most of these efforts make use of the so-called implicit
attitudes to gather more accurate responses and better predict political behavior. It
is important to note that, implicit attitudes operate on an unconscious level. Studies
show that even though people might be aware of their implicit attitudes (but not
necessarily approve), they might not know how implicit attitudes influences their
behavior. For this specific reason, individuals’ political behavior may be influenced
by their implicit attitudes on a particular topic or its related concepts (Gawronski,
Hofmann, and Wilbur 2006).
The relevance of the implicit measures in political science research is explained in
depth later in this thesis, however, the relevance of the measure when it comes to
assessing EU attitudes explaining why we specifically employ implicit measures can
be explained as follows: One of the reasons why especially implicit attitudes can help
explain EU attitudes is the “top of the head” nature of the EU related topics for
Turkish citizens. The EU is not a topic that constantly bothers or affects individuals’
lives. Therefore, it is expected that EU attitudes are somewhat disconnected from
rational opinion-forming processes. Secondly, issues such as the current state of
bilateral relations of the EU countries with the Turkish government, xenophobia
in the EU, and the populist rhetoric of the far-right European politicians might
generate responsive reactions, fear, or animosity towards the EU. Thirdly, the in-
group and out-group dynamics which might affect individuals’ attitudes are proven
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to be effectively measured by their implicit attitudes (Burdein, Lodge, and Taber
2006; Lodge and Taber 2005; Nosek et al. 2009; Wittenbrink, Gist, and Hilton 1997).
In addition, given that public opinion is relatively positive even when the bilateral
relations show a negative trend (European Commission 2009), social desirability
could be a strong factor when individuals answer explicit questions on the EU.
Implicit measures help avoid the problem of social desirability (Kim 2003; Steffens
2004). These aspects of the Turkish public opinion on the EU make us utilize
implicit attitudes and use them together with the conventional measures to assess
EU attitudes.
Even though the potential referendum question was also used to test through conven-
tional methods in previous studies of public opinion in Turkey (see European Com-
mission 2003; GMF 2014), no study has yet utilized implicit measures in examining
the attitudes towards the EU-Turkey relations. To our knowledge, a similar short-
age of research is also the case with the political voting behavior in Turkey. Given
the observed efficiency of implicit attitudes as measured by the IAT in similar com-
plex political voting situations in previous studies, we expected a similar outcome
in predicting the vote choices of the Turkish youth in a potential referendum.
The main aim of this study is to examine the relative strength of explicit and implicit
measures in the context of EU-Turkey relations, a topic in which there is no study
conducted yet. By considering the well-known shortcomings of both measures, I try
to present a combined model that could allow us to understand and explain more
about the Turkish public opinion on the EU. Here, the IAT will be used to assess
subconscious, implicit attitudes towards the EU, whereas the explicit attitudes,
which are known as the strong predictors of voting behavior, and political identity
will represent the conscious and rational side of the coin.
Another element of this study is the comparison of two rival social psychology the-
ories on inter-group relations, namely the social identity, and system justification
theory. These theories are selected for having a theoretical framework in which the
different and contrasting determinants of the Turkish public opinion towards the is-
sue of Turkey’s membership to the EU are examined. Social identity theory helps us
to understand the dynamics of inter-group relations from the “in-group favoritism”
perspective, whereas system justification theory is helpful by presenting the idea of
“out-group favoritism”. These theories were used to generate certain hypotheses to
be tested both by the conventional survey methods and the IAT technique.
This thesis starts with a section that includes a history of the EU-Turkey rela-
tionship. This historical account is presented by combining it with a chronology
that depicts the trends in the Turkish public’s support to Turkey’ candidacy and
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membership to the EU. In the next section, I introduce examples of the theoretical
explanations in the literature on public opinion. A separate section was devoted to
the afore-mentioned social psychological theories that have been proposed to explain
the inter-group attitudes and behaviors. The basic differences between social iden-
tity and system justification theories are discussed with a special reference to the
heterogeneity observed in the opinions of the Turkish public towards the EU. The
next section provides details of the concept of implicit attitudes. Combined with the
theoretical underpinnings of this concept, a detailed account of how implicit atti-
tudes are measured is presented with a specific reference to the IAT technique. The
last section before the method section explains the theoretical rationale behind the
present study and the specific hypotheses that were derived from the social identity
and system justification theory.
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2. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Turkish public opinion on the EU is very volatile and prone to periodical highs and
lows. This makes it very active and influential over both sides. With the extensive
media coverage of the EU in Turkey and the growing popularity of the accession
negotiations after the 2000s, the Turkish public’s knowledge of the EU is somewhat
established. This chapter provides a piece of brief background information on Turkey
and the EU’s long-lasting relationship and the dynamics behind the public opinion
and so-called “Euroscepticism”.
Euroscepticism is mainly used in the literature to define negative EU attitudes.
Within the member states or those that are on track to become one, Euroscepticism
has become a concept that is closely related to the status of the Europeanization
and relationship with the EU. The internal and external conditions and challenges
are closely related to the degree of negativity and suspicion towards the EU (Taggart
and Szczerbiak 2002).
Euroscepticism is defined by Taggart as “the idea of a contingent or qualified oppo-
sition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of
European integration” (Taggart 1998, 365). This definition mostly deals with the
EU-level Euroscepticism. Today the EU’s neighbors and future members demon-
strate a distinct type of Euroscepticism. Even non-European candidate states’ cit-
izens develop suspicions towards the entire Europeanization process, the policies,
institutions and repercussions. Europeanization, as a concept that is closely related
to identity and multiculturalism, generates a kind of skepticism drawing a differ-
ent picture than the one Taggart’s depicts. In this regard, Turkey’s candidacy is a
helpful example to see how a non-EU member state that is however a part of the
Europeanization process shows discontent with Europe.
Public opinion surveys focusing on the topic, show sharp changes in the public’s
perceptions of the EU over time. The Transatlantic Trends Survey’s (2014) findings
show that support for the membership1 decreased from 73% to 38%, from 2004
1“Generally speaking, is EU membership a good thing or a bad thing for Turkey?”.
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to 2010. The same survey also indicates that it, however, increased up to 53% in
2014. These data are important since they indicate that public opinion is prone
to periodical fluctuations. It is crucial to understand that public opinion is not
independent of the effects of exogenous events or influences. By looking at the
major socio-political changes and important incidences in terms of the relationship
between Turkey and the EU, it may be possible to understand the reasons for these
shifts.
Turkey, known for its geostrategic location between Europe and Asia, emerging
economy, and a large population consisting mostly of young people has been wait-
ing for its European Union membership much longer than any country in contention
for membership. Turkey’s association with the European Union is directly related
to integrating Turkey’s various economic, political, and legal norms to the Euro-
pean Union’s Copenhagen Criteria. Furthermore, the Turkish government and the
European Union need to come to a compromise, meaning that Turkey needs to
comprehend and accept the membership conditions for the European Union, while
the European Union needs to acknowledge and accept that Turkey’s various id-
iosyncrasies neither will pose a threat nor are unsuited to the European Union’s
socio-economic structure. In the future, when this equilibrium is reached, both
Turkey and the European Union will be able to work through the tensions escalated
throughout the accession negotiations process and concentrate on future potential
partnerships.
Following the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957,
Turkey was quick to become associated with the organization in 1963. The frame-
work of the association was legalized under what is called the “Ankara Agreement.”
One of the most important bases of the association with the EEC was the prospect
of a “Customs Union”, which would enable Turkey to export and import products
with the EEC member states without any restrictions. As stated in the agreement,
its main goal was to “achieve continuous improvement in living conditions in Turkey
and the European Economic Community through accelerated economic progress and
the harmonious expansion of trade and to reduce the disparity between the Turkish
economy and . . . the Community” (EEC 1963). This step has been a turning point
for Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s foreign relations with Europe.
In Turkey, the 1960s and 1970s shows severe ideological radicalization and political
polarization. The academia and students were under the formidable influence of
the radical left parties and movement. In the early 1970s, the influence of the
radical left grew among industrial workers, continued to spread among the new
migrants of big cities and also found a place within ethnic and religious minorities,
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for instance, the Kurds and the Alewis. Influenced by the leftist and anti-imperialist
ideas within the public, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) adopted more of a
radical leftist position in foreign policy issues which meant distancing Turkey from
the United States and the EC (The European Communities). In October 1978, as
the CHP government, Turkey suspended fulfilling its obligations towards EC. This
one-sided suspension was carried out based on the fact that trade liberalization and
low import tariffs were reducing the foreign currency revenues which were vital for
Turkey’s development efforts.
Going hand in hand with the leftist movement, in the 1960s and 1970s, the radical
right also saw its rise. The radical right was represented in politics by the Nation-
alist Movement Party (MHP) and the National Salvation Party (MSP). The MHP
represented Turkish ethnic-nationalism while the MSP represented Islamism. The
radical left and the radical right were both against improving Turkey’s ties with
the EC. According to the MSP, the EC was a Christian Club that was supported
both ideologically and financially by the Vatican. Thus, Turkey, a Muslim country,
should have no place within a Christian project. MHP, on the other hand, took
more of a mixed stance by taking the anti-imperialist discourse from the radical left
and adopting the anti-Christian ideology from the Islamists. The MHP’s stance was
that joining the EC, Turkey would give Europe an excellent chance to interfere in
Turkey’s internal affairs, which would potentially lead to weakening the unity of the
Turkish state, aggravate the demands of political minorities, and cause the over-
westernized Turks to revolt against the government, thus hurting the nation state.
The radical right parties never had large electoral supports but they were electorally
salient enough to divide the votes of the major center-right party, the Justice Party
(AP). This led the AP to form a coalition with two radical right parties to form
a government. AP’s radical right coalition partners in the late 1970s, which used
to be the Nationalist Front members between 1975 and 1977, used their influence
on the domestic and foreign policies, preventing all attempts of Turkey to become
closer to the EC (Yılmaz 2011).
Eurosupportiveness saw its zenith in the 80s and early 2000s. This rise in support
for the EC in 1980s was due to the relatively relaxed political environment in Turkey
that arose with the end of the military regime. All movements, especially political,
were heavily suppressed and the centrist parties supported reconciliation with Eu-
rope to strengthen and stabilize the fragile democracy in Turkey. This was the back-
ground in 1978 where the Turkish government applied for EC membership. Within
the given timetable, Turkey was able to make its market economy comply with the
European standards. The harmonization of the internal markets and integration to
the Customs Union helped Turkey continue the integration process with the rest of
8
the EU acquis, namely, the political and legal reforms. As a consequence, in 1987,
Turkey applied formally for EU membership. However, its formal candidate status
was not recognized until the Helsinki Summit of 1999. After the announcement of
the formal candidate status, the EU-Turkey relationship has picked up momentum.
At that moment, the relationship was more complex and interdependent compared
to the socio-political environment when the Ankara Treaty was signed.
The prospect of being a candidate was a pushing force for Turkey and created mo-
tivation to harmonize its remaining legislation and policies with the EU’s ‘acquis
communautaire’. The European Commission’s Accession Partnership Document ac-
celerated the harmonization process by setting a guideline for Turkey. This led to
the adoption of a National Programme in 2001, solely focused on the integration
to the EU. The coalition government 2 of the time adopted a constitutional reform
package that included the judicial cornerstones of the harmonization process. This
package brought amendments to the Constitution of 1982. It included the abolition
of the death penalty which is still a prominent and controversial topic in Turkish
society. The reforms continued after the change of government in 2002. The AKP
(Justice and Development Party) government did not hinder the process. Indeed, it
accelerated the reforms. The introduction of six harmonization packages, including
the new penal code, showed Turkey’s ambition and effort for the membership.
As in the 1970s, the 1990s was a period of turmoil where political processes were af-
fected by the polarization of ideologies, political radicalization, violence and military
interference. This polarization in the 90s was caused by Islamism and secularism
and Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism. In the 90s the Euroscepticism
of the radical right-wing parties became less severe while they were in power. From
mid-1999 to late 2002, MHP had an important role within the ruling coalition. This
coincided with the period when Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership was rec-
ognized by the EU following this the coalition government promised to carry out
reforms on minority rights, restricted rights on Turkish minority language education
and broadcasting and abolished capital punishment. Likewise, the governing party
between 1996 to mid-1997 RP (Welfare Party), did not apply its election promise
which was to cease the customs union with the EU.
As a consequence, in 2004, the successful adoption of the EU acquis by Turkey
prompted the EU for the activation of the full membership protocol, which led the
European Council decision to open membership negotiations with Turkey. After
that, at the Brussels Summit of 2004, the European Council concluded that Turkey
257th Government of Turkey (1999-2002). The Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party
(ANAP) , and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) were members of the coalition led by the DSP
leader, Bülent Ecevit.
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had complied sufficiently with the Copenhagen political criteria and that the acces-
sion process could officially begin on 3 October 2005 (Commission 2004, 3). At the
Helsinki Summit, the Council declared that Turkey is now a candidate country that
is destined to join the EU.
With Turkey’s candidate status, Euroscepticism started to decline once again.
AKP’s positive agenda towards the EU and pro-EU politics seem as an essential
determinant here. On the other hand, CHP as a Kemalist-secularist opposition
party started to balance AKP’s pro-EU policies with a Eurosceptic agenda. Pub-
lic opinion polls showed that CHP voters reacted to this shift, as the EU support
rates had gone down from 83% to 60%. CHP’s rhetoric included claims that the
AKP aimed to weaken the military which was then regarded as the guarantor of the
secularist establishment (Yılmaz 2011). CHP resorted to a nationalist rhetoric on
important domestic and international issues concerning Turkey such as the Cyprus
issue. MHP voters, which have been habitually Eurosceptic, have never been in
favor of the EU. The support of the MHP voters for the EU while the party was
in power between May 2002 and December 2005, dropped from 54% to 47%, then
in September 2007 to 44% . An exception is the Kurdish nationalists, Demokratik
Toplum Partisi (DTP) – Party for a Democratic Society - which is the successor to
the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP),
supporters who had unwavering support to the EU throughout this period. This
different attitude of HDP supporters can be explained that ethnic minority parties
are usually more supportive of the EU because they trust that their minority rights
will be acknowledged through the EU.
In the Turkish National Assembly after the 2007 general elections consisting of
four party groups, AKP and DTP were the only pro-EU parties whereas MHP
remained consistently Euroskeptical and CHP had been crossing the lines between
mild Eurosceptic to strong Eurosceptic discourses. However, all the turmoil within
the parliament did not hinder the positive reform processes that started in 2002
and productive rhetoric from the negotiating politicians of both the Turkish and
European fronts. This resulted in the highest support for the membership since
the start of the formal accession process. EU was finally seen as a credible partner
by the Turkish public that could commit and deliver its promises. Moreover, the
tangible results of Turkey’s progress lifted the levels of support to the membership
–both domestically and internationally. The Eurobarometer study of 2004 measured
the support as high as 71%. This was the highest ever support level measured in
Turkey. It is safe to say that these figures now look distant considering the Turkey-
EU relationship as of today.
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Shortly after the Brussels Summit, the accession negotiations commenced in October
2005, albeit incrementally. Yet, it was made clear by the EU that the membership
was not inevitable. The Commission report states that the process is “open-ended”
and “cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (Commission 2006). These were reminders
for Turkey that there was still a long road ahead.
In the following years, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union had seen
strong support from the public and political spheres. The successful integration pro-
cess and candidacy status intrigued Turkish citizens towards Europe with hopes of
economic and political prosperity. However, over time, this hopeful picture changed
to a disheartened one due to two fundamental reasons. Firstly, there was an ex-
pectation that the Customs Union would eventually evolve into a full membership,
which did not. Secondly, the EU’s attitude has long fluctuated between the implica-
tion of that Turkey will not be accepted to the European Union and the indication
that Turkey is too good of a country to be waiting this long (Erisen and Erisen
2014). That being said, these sentiments were not the only factors, as the prospect
of candidacy was interrupted with several internal and external factors.
The external factors are closely related to the changing image of Turkey in the eyes
of the influential member states. Certain member states such as France and Austria
were vocal about their attitude towards a potential Turkish membership. They
brought the possibility of national referenda, even if Turkey were to fulfill all the
requirements. The remarks of then-French President Nicholas Sarkozy went far by
stating that Turkey is not and would never be a European state, regardless of the
status of the negotiation process. This would perhaps sum up the gravity of the
remarks made by certain EU members (Müftüler-Baç 2017). Besides, Germany, one
of the critical figures that push for the commencement of the negotiation process,
had gone through an election and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came
to power. The new Chancellor Angela Merkel and her party drastically changed
Germany’s approach towards the accession negotiations. The negative atmosphere
and sudden lack of support from the influential members of the Union slowed down
the accession negotiations and created disappointment within the Turkish society.
Regional and international scope conditions for both the EU and Turkey did not
help the relations in the period after 2005. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009
hit Europe’s relatively smaller countries harshly and the prospect of membership for
Turkey was put even further away as Europe had to deal with internal problems. In
both decision-making and public levels, it fostered a negative climate which prevents
a dedicated focus on enlargement (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). The fundamen-
tal problems within the EU have strengthened the opposition to enlargement. Today,
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the European Union still faces internal problems. The looming shadow of the Brexit,
trade-related problems with the US, the lack of unity toward the establishment of
a unified European foreign policy and a stagnant market economy all contribute to
the causes of hesitancy in accepting Turkey as a member state. Adding to those, it
must be noted that there is a big transformation within Europe after the Euro Crisis
and the increasing tensions with the rise of Russia and refugee crisis put the EU in
a status where it needs to adhere to integration and preserve its borders rather than
enlarge them. All these conditions directly or indirectly affected Turkey’s prospect
of membership. The discussion of absorbing Turkey in a potential membership has
become more of a topic of political and economic discussions (Aydın-Düzgit 2012).
This added to the downward spiral of the discussions on Turkey’s cultural and so-
cietal differences which today waits to be reconciled by the European public.
From the internal side of things, after years of active reforms, AKP started to dis-
play indications of “reform fatigue”. The party was not as enthusiastic and assertive
as bringing new reforms and legislations. This was also connected to the unrequited
nature of the relations. The conditionality of the relations was broken and the cred-
ibility of the EU was weakening. Albeit initially interested in the EU membership,
AKP has always been skeptical about the process. The incumbent party, AKP were
enthusiastic in Turkey’s candidacy and working towards a full membership but in
the last couple of years, this has not been the case. The reason why AKP was
initially supportive of the candidacy may be explained as their reluctance to diverge
from the existing foreign policy at the time of its coming to power. After 2011, the
reforms had slowed, but the major breaking point was 2013 when a series “reversal
of reforms” were put in force (Müftüler-Baç 2017)
The AKP government’s stance toward the EU in its first electoral term was positive
but practical. Turkey’s candidacy to the EU was declared in 1999, and the accession
negotiations were initiated in 2005; throughout this process, AKP kept a Kemalist
façade on their foreign policy and displayed Europe as the safe haven of democracy
with higher welfare standards, which was the natural direction for Turkey (Alpan
2016). It should be noted that improving relationship with the EU and the reforms
enabled AKP to have the upper hand on many issues against the military and
judiciary (Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit 2012).
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted among scholars that the 2007 election was the
start of the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy of AKP (Bilgin and Bilgiç 2011). This
policy depends on Turkey’s Ottoman history and the Islamism to situate itself in the
broader region as a regional power (Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol 2015). While this
policy change was at the domestic level, the EU-Turkey relations was also coming to
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a halt, which was due to the slowing pace of the negotiations between Turkey and
the EU, the Eurocrisis, Cyprus stalemate, increasing anti-Turkish attitude among
the EU public, and worsening democratic practices in Turkey.
The current literature shows that the change in Turkey’s foreign policy and the
deterioration of the Turkey -EU relations changed in both the policy and identity of
the government, as a result of which Turkish political elites had distanced themselves
from Europe. The positive image of Europe changed to a negative image in the AKP
discourse, where the EU was represented as the unwanted intruder in Turkish politics
and a discriminatory entity which was historically and religiously different and is
democratically, politically and morally inferior to Turkey (Aydın-Düzgit 2016).
This can be traced back to the 60s where Europe was presented as morally inferior
to Turkey (Döşemeci 2013), as well as Europe’s representation as the unwanted
intruder goes hand in hand with the increase of the Sèvres syndrome in the 70s
(Aydın-Düzgit 2018). Nonetheless, after 2007, the above-mentioned representations
of Europe became the formal and officially pronounced views. Moreover, the novel
representations, e.g., Turkey being better than Europe thanks to its Ottoman past,
was also utilized by the AKP government and officials along with the frequent use
of the well-known past narratives in framing the EU accession process and other
matters.
One of the most important turning points in the EU-Turkey relationship came when
it was least expected. Not long after the successful summit of March 2016 regarding
the refugee issue and revitalization of the accession negotiations, Turkey experienced
a failed coup attempt. Before the failed coup attempt, the Transatlantic Trends
Survey data (2014) show that the pro-membership figures were increasing following
a stagnant period after 2011. The support figures hit 53%, which marks the highest
figure since 2006. The Eurobarometer data also show a similar picture. In the
November 2013 study, the pro-EU attitudes increased from 20% to 43%, which
is more than twice of an increase. Şenyuva’s (2014) study shows that most of
the pro-EU voters were center-left voters who were alarmed by the government’s
infringement of their rights and liberties. Those may see Europe as a potential
source of protection from the government and the integration process as a hope to
boost democracy.
Following the failed coup attempt, the Turkish government declared a state of emer-
gency and the measures taken afterward were harshly criticized by senior EU offi-
cials (Müftüler-Baç 2017). The major political changes in Turkey also conveyed the
message that reforms had halted. The relationship has deteriorated and Turkey’s
preparedness for the negotiations was pushed aside. This resulted in public opinion
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surveys showing that the support for the membership fell to 28%. This is the lowest
point in the history of the Turkey-EU relationship. This shows that the 15th July
coup attempt was the breaking point after the long and mostly negative trend of the
relationship. After a while, the support once again took a positive turn and started
to increase. The Eurobarometer study conducted in 2017 (European Commission
2018) shows that the EU supporters reached 47%. It is a significant change following
the increasing negativity in the relationship. Kadir Has University’s (2017) study
also confirms Eurobarometer’s results with 48.4% public support for the member-
ship. Even though it is intriguing how the support had built up so fast after a long
period of negativity since 2001 we see that Turkish public opinion is very responsive
to exogenous events affecting the Turkey-EU relationship.
The direction of the relationship and variety of challenges to it show that Turkey’s
path to membership is unique in every aspect. We can argue that both sides con-
stantly fail in their pledges and are more occupied with domestic politics. This
results in a trend in public opinion with lots of highs and lows. As mentioned
above, public opinion is not immune to all such turbulence within and between par-
ties, and the public reaction may follow a fluctuating pattern. Even though people’s
responses to these issues can be reduced to a simple state of support for membership
or vice-versa, many factors influence these attitudes. The next chapter provides a
summary of public opinion studies in Turkey and the theoretical explanations for
attitudes towards the EU.
2.1 Understanding Public Opinion Research
2.1.1 Public Opinion Studies in Turkey about the EU
In recent years, studies focusing on Turkish citizens’ attitudes and opinions towards
the EU have been attracting a lot of interest. However, this area of study is still rela-
tively under-developed when compared to other areas within the realm of European
studies. There is low if any, interest within this field in quantitative measures and
methods to understand the motives behind the Turkish people’s attitudes towards
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the EU. Thus, to understand the roots of these attitudes and the motives behind
the integration, it is necessary to explore new dimensions that may contribute to
the field. Previous studies that addressed certain issues and elements of the integra-
tion process and its ramifications, particularly focus on the in-group and out-group
dynamics of the attitudinal displays on the EU integration process of Turkey are
reviewed in this chapter.
Public opinion research and surveys on the Turkish public’s opinion towards the
EU membership are limited compared to those focusing on the EU member states.
The absence of a periodically updated database that is comprehensive enough to
address EU-related issues makes it hard for researchers to build on previous work
and investigate different dimensions of Turkey’s EU-integration process. However,
some essential studies were conducted in Turkey. They vary regarding their contexts,
how the data are used or collected, and how they explain different aspects of the
public opinion.
Firstly, the European Union’s public opinion database, the Eurobarometer, is a
crucial source. This database is a periodically updated platform where the data
from the citizens of European member states and candidate countries are collected
and disseminated. The data address many issues regarding the integration process
and specifically focuses on certain issue dimensions in each individual member or
candidate state. Turkey’s inclusion into this dataset dates back to 2001.
Muftuler-Bac and Mclaren’s (2003) study approaches public opinion from a different
aspect. The sample of the study is composed of the Turkish Grand National As-
sembly members and the data were collected from the parliamentarians themselves.
This methodology provides critical insight from those who directly influence the in-
tegration process. In this respect, this study emphasizes elite perceptions towards
the EU-Turkey relationship and attempts to predict the future of the negotiations.
The study points out the importance of some issues such as national sentiments
within the parliament and representatives’ prospects towards EU negotiations with
a questionnaire that could help further research to build on.
Most of the earlier research was quantitative and presented that pragmatic expec-
tations play a significant role in presenting the EU as positive among the Turkish
public (Çarkoğlu and Çiğdem Kentmen 2011) while, it was discovered that the un-
derstanding of democracy in Turkey among the public played a minor role in shaping
attitudes towards Europe (Kentmen 2012).
On the other hand, qualitative research was even less common, the only well-known
study is by Yılmaz (2011). Yılmaz’s research on Euroscepticism is based on the
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data from 2003. He identified the main sources of Euroscepticism in the public of
Turkey as concerns on national sovereignty, fear of losing moral values, perceptions
of discrimination against by the EU, and the Sevres Syndrome.
The study by Carkoglu, Erguder, Kirisci, and Yilmaz (2002) can be considered
among the pioneering public opinion studies regarding Turkey’s EU membership and
integration as well. It was followed by Carkoglu, Erguder, Kalaycıoglu and Yılmaz’s
work in TESEV. The importance of these studies is that they were empirically
informed, focusing on the determinants of Turkish public support towards the EU.
These studies extensively focus on the effects of economic considerations, support
for democracy and the effect of national identity among various other determinants.
2.2 Theoretical Explanations of Public Opinion Formation on the EU
The theoretical explanations on the EU and Turkey public opinion have mostly
been on cognitive terms(Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel and Palmer 1995).
The cognitive framework rests on that the nature of the relationship hinges on an
expansion to reach potential economic benefits. This is plausible given that Turkey is
a free-market economy with a young and dynamic workforce. Utility maximization
is the main motive in these models. The rational choice model explanations use
cognitive cost-benefit calculations while using the utility as the value (Erisen and
Erisen 2013)
One of the other public opinion theories on EU integration is the cognitive mobi-
lization theory. The theory can be traced back to the studies of Inglehart. Inglehart
(1991) defined it as the effect of socioeconomic and educational mobilization on how
an individual calculates costs and benefits of the integration process. The theory
posits that higher education and socioeconomic level result in higher support for
integration. This is coherent with the findings that show individual gains or losses
from the integration is the source for the attitude towards the EU (Anderson and
Reichert 1995). Gabel and Palmer (1995) also find similar results to the previously
explained studies. In their study, citizens who have the perception that the EU will
provide direct personal benefits are inclined to support the EU. This study finds
empirical support for that there is a distinction between direct personal benefits
and benefits for the whole nation. Potential benefits of the EU tend to affect indi-
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vidual support if the benefit is personal, while the support decreases if the benefit
is distributed within a group, in this context, the nation.
Arikan (2012) argues that group-centric arguments include perceived interests and
threats to society which show themselves in the attitudes towards the EU. Arikan
posits that the perceived material and political benefits boost public support for
the EU. On the other hand, perceived material and cultural threats create a decline
in this sentiment. Using the Eurobarometer survey data, the researcher tested this
hypothesis and showed that these sentiments are “rather than being determined by
rational calculations of costs and benefits to the self, attitudes towards the EU are
mostly motivated by perceived group benefits and symbolic concerns” (Arikan 2012,
82).
The self-interest-based explanations of political attitude formation are also com-
monly used in academic literature. The self-interest simply posits that individuals
make rational decisions when forming their political opinions. In other words, they
calculate their cost and benefits in any given situation (Kinder 1998). This approach
has been used by Turkish scholars to understand the Turkish public’s attitudes to-
wards the EU. Arikan, using both Carkoglu’s and Eurobarometer’s dataset, showed
that these utilitarian perspectives work well for both the European and Turkish
publics. Further explaining this phenomenon, using Carkoglu’s (2002) survey data
Arikan posits that “it could be that rather than their objective material position
in the society, people’s belief that they will benefit from integration may be the
decisive determinant of EU-related attitudes” (Arikan 2012, 83). These findings
also suggest that rational choice-based explanations can provide us with significant
power in explaining people’s evaluations of the integration process. It depends on
the rationale that any type of gain, whether it is political, economic, and/or social
is the source of attitudes. According to this study, many people see the EU as a
“source of benefits” to their country and believe that the EU will grant favorable
advantages to the country especially in the areas of democracy and human rights.
However, other studies show that cognitive evaluations are not the only driving
force of citizens’ political opinions. Gabel and Whitten’s (1995) empirical research
suggests that cognitive evaluations such as cost-benefit evaluations help explain the
EU integration support, yet national identity bears significant explanatory power as
well. This shows that non-cognitive processes such as nationalistic convictions may
still balance or overcome cognitive evaluations. Therefore, I believe it is possible to
argue that attitudes towards the EU and attitudes, in general, can be explained by
measuring individuals’ irrational sentiments that do not rely on simple cost-benefit
calculations. This promises to add more to the public opinion domain than the
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measures only based on cognitive assumptions such as cost-benefit or interest-based
calculations. Henri Tajfel (1982) shows that individual-level motives are repeatedly
ignored when in-group motivations and pressures are in place. That is, the presence
of group identity may overcome rational choice-based expectations.
McLaren (2006) rejects such rational choice explanations by positing that those have
a problem of objectivity as they are limited by the knowledge of the individuals
about the issue. Adding to that, Mclaren states that national identity is a crucial
component of individuals’ attitudes towards the EU. Mclaren emphasizes that strong
threat perceptions regarding issues such as immigration and loss of sovereignty are
also as significant as utility-based motivations when forming attitudes towards the
EU (McLaren 2002). The idea of losing the nation-state related features such as
border and migration controls to a supranational entity such as the EU is a concern
for nationalistic groups. The strength of the in-group identity reflects the perception
of the out-group. De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005) support McLaren’s findings in
their study where they show that immigration is the most significant factor affecting
the attitudes towards the EU.
In general, group-centric theories build on that in-group favoritism is quite decisive
in the formation of individuals’ attitudes. Their common features involve specific
assumptions about the group and individual behavior and attitudes. Jost and Banaji
(1994) state that the theories that give the in-group motives a pivotal place tend to
assume that there is solidarity, support, and justification of the group’s and group
members’ interests against outgroup members.
Brewer and Roderick (1985) state that in-group similarities are preferred over dis-
similar out-group attributes. This is line with the seminal work of Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) on inter-group relations that posits preju-
dice is directed at the out-group or out-group members as a form of hostility. These
two works share the in-group favoritism feature in their explanations of the atti-
tudes towards the other. Bobo, Sidanius, and Pratto (1994) assert that inte-rgroup
relations in a society are inherently conflict-laden. Sidanius and Pratto (1993) also
state that “prejudice, discrimination, and institutionalized oppression are inevitable
outcomes of inter-group relations”.(as cited in Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 882)
Brewer’s (1979) studies add to the approaches mentioned above by many scholars.
They state that inter-group behavior is ethnocentric and in-group favoritism is in-
evitable. Elites of dominant groups become hegemonic when it comes to imposing
their will on the subordinate group (Fiske 1993). This is an interesting finding
which shows us a similarity with the rationality-based approaches (which will be
mentioned below) in a systematic way. Members of subordinated groups first seek
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to escape from the implications of group membership by exercising their individual
exit and mobility options (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Consequent literature further
supports the claim stating that “[p]olitical ideology mirrors/group membership, in-
dividual and collective self-interest and/or social position.” (as cited in Jost, Banaji,
and Nosek 2004, 882)
The theoretical insights examined in this section lead us to hypothesize about the
in-group favoritism aspect of the Turkish public’s attitudes towards the EU. Europe
and Turkey both have historically negative constituted images of each other. The
conceptualization of the out-group and in-group are mostly as symbolizations of
each other as the “Self” and “Other”.
This is in line with Muftuler-Bac’s (2000) suggestion that “...all that is non-European
determines what Europe is, and in the case of a non-European identity, it is all
that is European that sets its self-image. The concepts of Europeanness and non-
Europeanness are thought to be mutually exclusive with the line of demarcation
between “civilized” Europe and “barbaric” non-Europe.” (Müftüler-Bac 2000, 26).
This similar kind of identity formation is expected to be evident among the Turk-
ish public as well. Supporting Muftuler-Bac, McLaren also suggests that Turkey’s
membership process creates a different type of effect on groups of citizens of the
EU. The effect shows itself in the reactions which are related to the symbolic threat
perceptions when the Turkish candidacy is brought up. However, other prospective
candidates are treated based on utility-based calculations.
2.3 Conclusion
To understand the Turkish public’s attitudes towards the EU, without disregard-
ing the effect of rationality-based explanations, I believe moving beyond them and
focusing on in-group and out-group perceptions of Turkish people is very impor-
tant. Because opinions are not only based on rationality in many occasions, we
observe that groups may behave in ways that are hard to explain using a rational
choice framework. As in the case of the EU-Turkey relationship, identity politics
constitutes an indispensable part of these attitudes. In line with the group-centric
approaches in previous literature, public opinion studies have mostly focused on
group interests in the form of ethnic or social identity.
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In these respects, this study acknowledges that rational and cognitive theories pro-
vide solid explanations for the nature of the relationship between the EU and Turkey.
However, they are insufficient for accounting for all different aspects of public opinion
formation. By introducing social psychological theories related to political processes,
the picture will be clearer. To such end, social identity and system justification the-
ories, and implicit attitudes will be explained in detail in the next section.
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3. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
3.1 The Social Psychological Bases of the Relationship between the EU
and Turkey
It is clear from the previous review of political and sociological studies that the
public opinion towards the Turkey-EU relations has exhibited a pattern that can
be characterized by some periods of stability and change. Although the object
of the attitudes, namely the Turkey-EU relation, stayed the same throughout the
process of candidacy, there have been times in which people’s perceptions towards
the issue of candidacy have been quite positive or negative. Besides, the diversity in
the Turkish public opinion regarding the candidacy issue is also evident. It would
be plausible to assert that this dynamic and heterogeneous nature of the issue of
attitudes toward the Turkey-EU relations cannot be fully examined only by using
sociological or political analyses. Given the subjective nature of these attitudes,
a psychological approach would help capture the individual-level factors operating
behind the formation and maintenance of these attitudes.
A branch of psychology, namely social psychology, offers some theoretical perspec-
tives that may be effective in explaining the above-mentioned pattern of stability
and change in public opinion. A limited number of multi-level theoretical approaches
(for example, social identity theory, social dominance theory, and system justifica-
tion theory) from the intergroup relations area of social psychology have been widely
used for studying the social problems that are originated from the tense relation-
ships between societies or groups. These relatively new and promising approaches
seem to be effective in handling the issues is necessary and much-needed depth in
other areas of social sciences. As these new approaches have been developed as a
reaction to the individualistic and reductionist explanations that dominated social
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psychology for decades, they are welcomed by other social scientists as well, such as
political psychologists (Huddy 2001).
However, these frameworks differ from each other in terms of their focuses and ba-
sic assumptions regarding the general nature of status hierarchies in societies. For
example, social dominance and system justification theories have been designed to
explain why the status hierarchies in societies tend to be stable, whereas social
identity theory is more effective in explaining the change in the status quo of dis-
advantaged groups in the hierarchical structures. In the present study, two of these
theoretical frameworks, namely, social identity theory and system justification the-
ory, are utilized in understanding the dynamic nature of the Turkey-EU relations.
3.2 The Social Identity Theory
Social Identity Theory is a multi-level theory which helps to understand the relation-
ships between group attitude and behavior from the perspective of social psychology.
This theory is closely related to the group phenomenon and deals with similarity,
stereotype, identification, in-group bias, group norms, group identity, discrimina-
tion and prejudice (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 33). Besides, this theory was the first
attempt to overcome the difficulties that were originated from the reductionist and
individualistic approach that dominated the area of social psychology until the ’80s.
Before the 80s, Sherif tried to criticize this individualistic tradition with a theory,
namely, the Realistic Group Conflict Theory that emphasized the interdependency
between the group members and the group as a whole. In his three staged ex-
periments, namely the Robbers Cave experiment, where the participants’ group
consisted of 11-12-year-old males in a summer camp. This experiment showed that
being an unmixed group could affect entire in-group relations and that individual
anger or ideological differences do not cause hostile attitudes towards an outgroup.
Rather, what causes hostile attitudes are directly related to ingroup and outgroup
relations. Furthermore, common objectives which need intergroup cooperation may
help rectify these hostile relations between groups (Sherif 1966)
Social Identity Theory, inspired by Sherif’s perspective, evaluates social identity and
(parallel to identity) social behavior as a dimension that demonstrates continuity
between its two extremes, which is different from previous theories assuming that
22
social behavior is solely as interpersonal. One point is true, through individual
identity and interpersonal relations. However, the crucial point is social identity
and intergroup relations (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 34).
3.2.1 Social Categorization
Social categorization is a cognitive process by which individuals divide social com-
plexity into different compartments and, categories and sort them. However, this
process should not be seen as an objective cognitive mechanism, as it is affected by
the values, culture and social representations of social structure which an individual
is a part of. Therefore, social categorization is not an objective process, On the con-
trary, it is a subjective organization that the individual conducts by taking himself
as a reference point (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 41)
The categorization of the social structure of an individual alone does not help that in-
dividual to give meaning to his or her social environment but simultaneously, thanks
to his or her group membership, helps understand her position in this structure and
thus determine her social identity (Tajfel and Turner 2001, 40)
Due to their group memberships, individuals become more and more like their in-
group prototypes and transforms “I (self) into we (collective self / social identity)”
(Hogg and Williams 2000, 92). On the other hand, the in-group prototype that
transforms individuals to us, contrary to the subjective prototype of the out-group,
is perceived as more attractive by the in-group members (Hogg and Moreland 1993,
97).
According to the Social Identity Theory, in-group favoritism (i.e., when the in-group
is preferred and favored against the outgroup) is due to individuals trying to affirm
their own social identities in the categories they are a member of since social identity
stems from the social category an individual belongs to. In other words, according
to the Social Identity Theory, the main role of membership to a social category
and the comparison process is to help a person acquire a positive social identity
and thus a positive self-construct and self-respect (Brewer and Kramer 1985, 224).
This is because individuals can only develop a positive social identity if their own
group has a stronger and more prestigious image than the comparison groups (Tajfel
and Turner 2001, 40). Moreover, this can only be obtained by the person who
shows favoritism towards her own social category concerning the outgroup (Hogg
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and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1982)
Social Identity Theory suggests that to create a group identity and identify with
a group, a mutually positive relationship among individuals of the group is not
mandatory. The essential condition is having a positive attitude towards the per-
ceived prototype of the group, of which the individual is a member of due to social
categorization (Hogg and Moreland 1993, 95). This indicates that identification is
defined, along with positive attitudes towards in-group, as the individual’s feelings
of belonging and commitment to his/her own group.
Individuals, to affirm their own self-construal, compare their own group to other
groups and try to create a positive distinction from others. Similarly, acting ac-
cording to the group norms, having positive feelings, respect and trust toward the
in-group, finding oneself similar to the in-group members, defining oneself and the
out-group through stereotypes and using ethnocentrism becomes possible when the
commitment and belonging felt towards the in-group is prominent (Haslam, Reicher,
and Reynolds 2012; Hogg and Moreland 1993)
Group identity plays an important role for people when creating a positive self-
image. Positive social identity stems from the fact that an individual will favor
its own group of which he/she is a member compared to the comparison group.
However, when the group descends in social hierarchy its contribution to creating
one’s social identity also diminishes. Consequently, group members will either try
either to enhance the positivity of their self-images or to preserve their existing
positive images through various strategies (Hogg and Williams 2000, 87). Tajfel
and Turner (2001)argue that social attitudes of individuals and groups are dependent
on belief systems which may be seen as the reflection of the nature of inter-group
relations existent in the status quo. These belief systems are formed according
to how the social structure is perceived whether it is flexible, permeable, and/or
legitimate.
3.2.2 Turkey-EU Relations from the Perspective of the Social Identity
Theory
Turkish public opinion is a group phenomenon. It can be investigated through the
group identity and the formation of this identity. Symbolic matters and interests
concerning a group, affect the identity formation process. This is what the social
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identity theory seeks to answer (Tajfel 1982). Individuals represent a group identity
that is, a matter of fact, a part of their identity, to construct a self-reflective image
of themselves to the members of out-groups (Huddy 2001). As mentioned, social
identity is a very important issue in the EU integration process and the identity-
based politics have a substantive role in which the public directly is a part of. This
comes from the understanding that the “national identity” is the primal reference
point for the identity of the state (Taggart 1998). Following these remarks, it can
be plausibly argued that groups with stronger nationalistic tendencies or ideologies
reflect national identities which classify EU as an entity that erodes national interest
and identity. This leads to the dismissal of any further integration by these parties
and their constituent groups.
The Turkish political atmosphere also shows that there are a disparity and misalign-
ment of interests within political parties towards the EU. This being part of identity
politics in Turkey, Euroscepticism based on identity has been reflected vocally by
far-right political parties such as the Turkish nationalists MHP (Nationalist Action
Party) and the Islamist SP (Felicity Party). This is as expected and in line with
many other prospect countries and member states. For the MHP, EU accession is a
threat as its program possesses the bolstering of minority rights and the imposition
of new rules over the Turkish state in certain areas which they believe that they will
serve the hands of foreigners who are continuing to take the country under Western
patronage and creation of a physically divided Turkey. Moreover, the Islamists’ view
of the EU is rather shown more hostile with remarks such as the “Christian Club”,
where there is no place for Muslims.
The historical background of the relations carries a strong role in such perceptions,
depending on the collective memories on the long Christianity versus Islam dispute.
This dispute, more or less, continues for both groups. Especially in Turkey, where
the stagnation of the accession process is regarded as a humiliation against Christian
Europeans and this disappointed feeling towards the EU fuels the traditionalist and
ethnocentric ideas within Islamist and nationalist groups. Therefore, these groups
propose different ways for political directions for the future of the integration process.
The examples could very well point to a direction where the effect of perceived
threats from out-groups is the main influence behind the public opinion and at-
titudes. In my opinion, this is not separable from the realistic, game-theoretical
models that were mentioned above where the material benefits were also the ra-
tionale behind the attitudes. Out-groups may pose a threat to the identity of the
in-groups as well as the interests of other social groups that may share another
identity which is based on material similarities. Another threat that is observed to
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be substantive is cultural and symbolic threats. Social identity theory posits that
the symbolic concerns of individuals may very well contribute to their threat per-
ceptions. These threat perceptions could stem from identity-related issues to hold
irrational value-based concerns over out-groups (Kinder and Sears 1981). Mclaren
(2002) finds that immigrants or diverse ethnic groups increase the threat percep-
tions and the existence of a threat from different ethnicities decreases support for
further integration in specific issues in the EU member states. This is expected as
the “Other” can possess a fear in the public that the status-quo will change and
the economic and societal comfort of the individuals will be threatened (McLaren
2006). The important thing is that the symbolic threats lead to a dismissal of fur-
ther integration within these countries. But the content of these threats is barely a
danger neither to the integrity of the society, nor their economic well-being.
Then, it is safe to hypothesize that the EU, as it has been seen as a “Christian club”
by the Turkish public and authorities, the importance of the perceived symbolic and
material threats have a negative effect on people’s perception on the EU-Turkey re-
lations and EU, in general. And the social identity theory would posit that symbolic
effects would bear more effect on the issue as people may be more inclined to follow
their own social group which they share the same identity.
As shown, current theoretical explanations and previous works, societal and
individual-based components, along with the perceived material and political bene-
fits are jointly important when one is explaining the positive EU attitudes. On the
other hand, perceived threats and a strong sense of a social identity lead to a more
negative perception of the EU, according to in-group favoritism based theories and
expectations.
3.3 The System Justification Theory
System Justification theory was developed by Jost and Banaji (1994). Different from
previous theories on intergroup relations focusing on ego-justification and group-
justification System Justification Theory added motivation of an individual to defend
the stability and continuity of the hierarchical structure within a society, even though
it may not benefit the individual or the group. This is defined as system-justification
motivation.
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To fully grasp the system justification theory, ego-justification and group-
justification motives should be reviewed. Ego-justification indicates that individuals
develop stereotypes to protect and justify their own position and attitudes (Jost and
Banaji 1994, 2). In other words, ego-justification is the motivation of the individ-
ual to achieve a positive self-perception (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887). In
the group-justification motive, stereotypes are created to ensure the continuity of
the whole group’s social status (Jost and Banaji 1994, 2). Thus, group-justification
is the motivation of the individual to perceive the group he/she is a member of
as positive and legitimate (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887). Although both
justification motivations are useful, they come short in explaining how individuals
or individual’s in-groups accept negative stereotyping towards themselves and how
these stereotypes become widespread in society. To address these problems, Jost
and Banaji proposed that, apart from ego and group justification, there should be
another motivation. Hence, they focused on system justification as a motivation to
address the permanence of the status quo (Jost and Banaji 1994, 2)
System justification is the motivation to support the status quo even though it may
be disadvantageous for the individuals or groups within a society (Jost and Banaji
1994, 10). In other words, system justification is a psychological process by which
the existing social, political, economic and gender-related conditions are accepted
and justified as logical, good, fair, natural, desired and inevitable just because they
exist (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887). Founded upon
this motivation, system justification theory indicates that stereotypes emerged, not
for the benefit of the individual or group, but to explain the economic and social
status, and the inequality between the distribution of power and resources (Jost and
Banaji 1994, 3). Individuals, instead of questioning the legitimacy of their roles or
statuses presented to them by the system, define themselves and others with traits
(positive or negative) that are coherent with their social position. Therefore, the
stereotypes that are created in this stage are used as a tool to justify the system
(Jost and Banaji 1994, 11). For example, when stereotypes such as “untalented,
dirty, unintelligent, unreliable” are assigned to people who work in a certain career
field, these stereotypes are then used to legitimize unequal payment and their low
rank within the status quo for workers in that career field (Jost and Banaji 1994,
12).
Stereotypes that were created with the motivation for system justification are not
only for out-group members. These stereotypes also provide self-assessment and
help them to understand and explain their own position and roles that the sys-
tem has provided them. Therefore, lower-ranking group members tend to blame
themselves, not the system and believe that they deserve their positions (Jost and
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Banaji 1994, 13). Moreover, they justify their own inferiority more than in real-
ity (Haines and Jost 2000, 231). This self-depleting belief further inhibits them
from attempting to obtain a higher position. The powerful/advantageous groups
are stereotyped in a way that their power and achievements are justified even by
the powerless/disadvantageous groups, and the powerless/disadvantageous groups
self-stereotype themselves in a way that indicates they deserve their position. This
stereotyping justifies everyone’s position within the status quo and leads to its per-
manence (Jost and Banaji 1994, 14).
Nevertheless, scholars accept that all stereotypes cannot be explained using the
system justification approach. Hence, they propose ego and group justification
approaches. Those two also point out that, many stereotypes serve to legitimize
the status quo; without considering this motivation, the reasons for negative self-
stereotyping towards oneself and in-group, and the permanence of the status quo
cannot be properly understood (Jost and Banaji 1994, 16). Therefore, the system
justification theory explains the relationship between an individual and the social
system she belongs to by incorporating all three system justification approaches.
According to the System Justification Theory, it is possible that these three motiva-
tions can be in conflict and contradistinction to each other for individuals. Since ego
and group justification approaches centralize the benefit of the individuals, these mo-
tivations pave the way for social change. Besides, the system justification approach,
which comprises of the social and psychological needs to legitimize the status quo, is
considered in the literature as somewhat stronger than the other two. It is the power
of the system justification approach that ensures the permanence of the status quo.
However, when no explanation justifies the system, ego and group justification may
be considered superior and urge the disadvantaged group to create social change
(Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004, 887).
3.3.1 The EU-Turkey Relations from the Perspective of the System Jus-
tification Theory
As seen in the above explanations, System Justification Theory differs from social
identity theory in its attempt to explain the perceptions towards the advantaged
groups in a system of status hierarchies. For social identity theory, members of
disadvantaged groups try to increase the value of their identities by using some
identity management strategies that range from simple demands for changing or
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modifying the comparison standards used in the society to some direct competition
methods such as organizing under political parties or in resistance movements. In
general, the dominant responses of members of disadvantaged groups can be seen
in the context of in-group and out-group confrontation and driven by an in-group
identification.
On the other hand, for system justification theory, it is the out-group favoritism
that makes it possible for the system to be stable and resistant to change. From the
perspective of System Justification Theory, the relationships between Turkey and the
EU can be considered as a system of status hierarchies at which individuals (group
members) develop attitudes based on their perceptions towards the legitimacy of
it. As the main motivation for the individual is to perceive a system as just and
legitimate, individuals may be expected to support the status differences between
their groups and the superior group (or groups) by expressing positive attitudes
toward the advantaged groups (i.e., out-group favoritism). However, due to some
reasons (most of them are related to social desirability expectations), such attitudes
are not easy to be expressed explicitly. Therefore, the most suitable way is to
measure them by using implicit techniques such as implicit association tests.
3.4 Implicit Attitudes
3.4.1 The Implicit Association Test (IAT)
As mentioned above, the evaluation of the attitudes towards the EU is a subject
of growing importance in political science. Assessment of the attitudes is mostly
made using explicit measures such as survey studies and unstructured interviews
(Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Yet, political research has grown into a field in which
methods of various disciplines have started to be adopted. These disciplines are
mainly the ones that intensively focus on the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of
humans, such as social and cognitive psychology. This field of research has concluded
that there is not only a controlled, “explicit” form of attitudes, but also an “implicit”
one (Friese, Hofmann, and Schmitt 2008) Understanding the importance of using
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both types of methods gave birth to the Implicit Association Test (IAT). As IAT is
a continuous measure (often within the range of -2 and 2), it allows us to measure
both negative and positive associations. It disables any kind of initial adjustment in
the attitude; thus, it helps to explain the sorts of situations people may experience
where they may not have the time for lengthy and conscious access to their thoughts.
Considering that political science is a field with an abundance of symbols, such
symbols may trigger implicit, affective reactions (Lodge and Taber 2005).
Choma, Hafer (2009) and Roccato (2010) found that these attitudes help explain
voting behavior. Likewise, the superiority of an additive model (consisting of explicit
and implicit measures) to an explicit-only model in explaining voting behavior was
found elsewhere (Roccato and Zogmaister 2010). These studies were then furthered
by Galdi, Arcuri, Gawronski (Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008), who point out
the importance of implicit attitudes in understanding the voting calculi of, especially
undecided voters.
After presenting the applicability and importance of the implicit measures for the
field of political science, it is important to point out why EU attitudes are fit for the
dual-process model. Firstly, EU related issues are not remarkably obvious or promi-
nent for Turkish citizens. Most of the integration happens at an intergovernmental
level rather than inter-group or individual. Secondly, the history of the relations and
current state of affairs (e.g., Brexit, EU-Turkey relations, immigration, and cultural
conflict) may breed the formation of implicit attitudes and non-cognitive reactions.
Thirdly, the uncontrollable nature of the implicit attitude formation helps us assess
and eliminate potential in-group or outgroup effects such as political alignment or
partisanship (see Burdein, Lodge, and Taber 2006; Lodge and Taber 2005; Nosek
et al. 2009; Wittenbrink, Gist, and Hilton 1997). This touches upon the distorted
essence of the explicit attitudes as well. Perceived social desirability and any kind
of behavioral bias constitute the biggest limitations of explicit answers to survey
questions (Leary and Kowalski 1990; Paulhus 1984). It is important to note that
individuals’ attitudes towards an issue like the European integration process are
closely linked to the political atmosphere in the country. Hence, such questions
might not receive adequate and most honest replies. Implicit measure bypasses the
issue of social desirability or in-group bias (Kim 2003)
IAT asks the participants to classify stimuli objects presented on a computer screen
in a fast and continuous manner. These objects are often attribute (such as Good and
Bad) and target concepts (such as Cat and Dog.). The concepts may be objectified
by words or images. In an IAT test, they are carried out as a series of blocks. The
respondent is presented one block at a time. Before each block, the respondent
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is instructed by the program to categorize these concepts. The instructions differ
in each block which depends on the foundation of the given block’s measure. The
respondent presses on the assigned keys with her both hands to categorize the stimuli
objects that represent the concepts. Each block measures the associations between
the attribute and target concepts. For example, a type of block may request the
respondent to press a key with her left hand when she is presented with the concepts
of “Good and Cat”. On the other hand, “Bad” and “Dog” are assigned to the
right hand. The blocks get reversed between blocks to measure the strength of the
association between the Good and the Cat, and the Dog and the Bad.
Reaction speed is crucial in the classification of the concepts, but respondents are
expected to make a few mistakes. Mistakes are shown on the computer monitor as a
red “X” to enable the respondent to rapidly correct it and continue. The speed of the
classification is crucially important. However, it does not bear any meaning on its
own. As each block progresses, each attribute-target concept sequence is compared.
IAT allows us to compare the average latency in each block. As a consequence, the
attribute and target concepts that take longer to affiliate with one another give us the
measure of the relative implicit association to the attribute concept (Hofmann et al.
2005, 1375). Given the theoretical expectation that, while the explicit evaluations
can be decoded to their affective and cognitive elements, the implicit evaluations
are more deeply related to the affective element of the attitudes (Smith and Nosek
2011, 300)
Any task is expected to get lengthier when rapid reactions are met with slower
introspective reactions. Conscious and lengthy reactions are often observed when
explicit attitudes are expressed. However, the same cannot be said about the implicit
ones. Reprocessing and cognitive control are minimal throughout the IAT processes.
When reprocessing lengthens, it opens the way for a potential cacophony of thoughts.
Other problems such as social desirability bias may emerge as well. Thus, IAT
appears as one of the, if not the, most straightforward measuring techniques for
“affective orientation” Campbell and his colleagues (1960) discussed.
Another dimension of the IATs is the prediction of political behavior. Studies show
that IATs perform notably stronger than the explicit-only models (Greenwald et al.
2009). The predictive power of the IATs is especially better than the explicit-only
methods when the studies are conducted closer to the election date (Friese, Bluemke,
and Wänke 2007). Empirical evidence shows that implicit and explicit measures tap
onto different dimensions in explaining political behavior (Iyengar and Westwood
2015; Ryan 2017).
In this study, I build on previous literature and move beyond voting behavior, and
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suggest that an additive model combining implicit and explicit measures may help
explain political attitudes and (intended) behavior, particularly individual attitudes
and behavior towards the European Union. Recent studies suggest that voting in
referenda and public opinion formation are more complex than merely voting in
an election (Galdi, Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008). As the recent referendum in the
United Kingdom to exit the EU suggests, issue-related referendums demand more
complex explanations. Since Turkey is a country where referenda are frequently used
as a political tool, attitudes towards issues that are not directly related to political
parties or candidates constitute an important topic to study.
In this section, I will outline the recent developments on the implicit attitudes
concerning their use in political science and behavioral studies. IATs had not been
seen as useful instruments for predicting behavior for a long time, especially in the
circumstances involving conceiving and control. Thus, their predictive ability was
underestimated (Perugini 2005). Nevertheless, this trend is now reversed thanks
to the success of the additive methods that combine explicit and implicit measures.
Combining these two sorts of models provided scholars with great explanatory power
specifically with regards to individual behavior (Dovidio et al. 1997).
Even though the IAT was used in various behavioral studies before, its first use in
political science was by Karpinski (2005). This study focused on the US presidential
election in 2000 and showed that implicit attitudes were significant determinants of
voting intention. However, the implicit model was not as significant as the explicit
model when the two methods were compared. The validity of IATs was further
tested in a larger representative study (Roccato and Zogmaister 2010). The study
was conducted before the 2006 Italian elections and showed that IAT contributed
significantly and increased the predictive power of explicit measures. The study
showed that there was a consistent relationship between IAT and voting behav-
ior(Roccato and Zogmaister 2010). With the addition of the implicit attitudes, the
study improved our ability to explain (self-reported) voting behavior to a much
higher extent than that for voting intention.
IAT’s predictive validity found empirical support in another study as well. This
study was conducted before the 2001 Italian General elections. The study suggested
that IATs significantly predict the voting behavior of decided and undecided citi-
zens Arcuri and colleagues (2008). In a similar study, Galdi and his/her colleagues
(2008) utilized IAT to predict attitudes and opinions towards a local issue. Their
study shows that for undecided citizens the measure significantly predicts future
opinions. This was, however, not the case for explicit attitudes of the undecided.
Strikingly, the opposite could be said about decided citizens where explicit attitudes
32
were significant determinants of their behavior, well above and beyond their implicit
attitudes.
Interestingly, two other more recent studies show a different picture. Roccato and
Zogmaister (2010) and Friese and his colleagues’ (2012) studies further support
the importance of the so-called additive model and its higher explanatory power.
However, both studies find that explicit attitudes were more significant predictors
of the vote choices of both decided and undecided voters. These findings contradict
Galdi’s (2008) above-mentioned study. The authors argue that the reason is that
both sorts of measures highly overlap and implicit measures increase the predictive
power of the explicit measures only incrementally. However, all previous studies
conclude that the additive, combined, models are quite useful and should be used
when modeling voting behavior.
3.4.2 Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT)
This study utilizes a brief version of the IAT measure. The Brief Implicit Associa-
tion Test (BIAT) has a relatively shorter design than standard procedures (Sriram
and Greenwald 2009). It requires less time to administer, however, the aims and
measures of the test are the same. In the standard IAT, four focal categories are
presented as single focal points in each of the seven blocks. However, in BIAT just
two categories are focal and the respondent is presented with a combination of focal
and non-focal concepts. All in all, BIAT stands as an efficient version of the IAT.
It is also a quick and reliable measure as shown in several studies in previous lit-
erature (see D. Pavlovic and Žeželj 2013; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Sriram and
Greenwald 2009)
To exemplify the administrative content in our study, when the respondent is pre-
sented with the “Turkey” block of the BIAT, he is instructed to press only one key
(in our case P) on a laptop for Turkey related images and for “Positive” words such
as “Joy, Love, Peace, Perfect,” and the other key (in our case Q) for anything other
than the specified concepts. This process differs with only focal points changing
throughout the exercise. The difference from the standard IAT is the way that it
is designed. In the BIAT design, the EU-related images and “Negative” words such
as “Ugly, Disgrace, Terrible, and Horrible” are assigned to another key and the test
would continue with both focal and non-focal concepts being altered in each round.
The BIAT design also includes two training blocks to make the participant get fa-
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miliar with the procedure. The other six blocks are used to calculate the implicit
attitude scores. In BIAT and this study, the self and in-group related categories are
always focal and the “other” categories are non-focal. The reason is that the self-
association aspect of the measure is more reliable than trying to associate with the
“Other” (Sriram and Greenwald 2009) Following previous literature employ BIAT
tests, the “D-score” is utilized to interpret the results of the measure (Greenwald,
Nosek, and Banaji 2003). As mentioned above, the standardized score ranges from
-2 to 2 and is calculated as follows:
D = Latency(EU)−Latency(TR)
SD
That is, the mean response latency scores of each block’s target categories are sub-
tracted from the respondent score, then the difference is divided by the standard
deviation (for a detailed explanation of the computation of the D-score, (see Green-
wald, Nosek, and Banaji 2003). Positive results indicate that the participant is
faster in responding to the EU images and Positive words pairings than she is for
Turkey images and Positive words pairings. As faster responses imply that the re-
spondent has an automatic association with the given category, we can infer that
a positive result in this measure shows an inclination, more positive affection, and
automatic association for the EU. The reverse of the score would imply an automatic
association with Turkey.
The blocks of four items are randomly ordered and they repeat two times over
the process. The repetitions consist of “outgroup (EU)+positive” and “ingroup
(Turkey)+positive” blocks. A group is paired with positive words, meanwhile the
other is paired with negative ones. The figure in the Appendices shows a block
example used in our study. It provides the mentioned categorization of groups and
pairings. In this study, the target stimuli are the European Flag and “positive” word
pairings. Respondents with positive EU attitudes are expected to respond faster and
categorize the flag with positive attributes. For those with positive Turkey, attitudes
are expected to show the opposite, a slower reaction.
3.4.3 Advantages of the Measure
IAT aims to assess the automatic association processes of individuals. Therefore, it is
quite difficult to deceive the test with responses that do not reflect the participant’s
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actual attitudes. More importantly, social desirability bias or identity-based strate-
gies are hardly effective in test results (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998,
1465). In other words, even though respondents try to hide their true attitudes,
IAT is quite successful in revealing their deeply-seated prejudices or stereotypes.
This is one of the major advantages of IAT compared to the other tests used for
such purposes that is based on respondents’ self-declaration. The other main ad-
vantage of IAT is that it does not get affected by the other various factors in the
procedure. Greenwald and his colleagues (1998) showed that IAT scores are not
affected by the methodological changes such as the number of stimulants or the
position of the chosen category (left or right). Another striking advantage shown by
Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, and Banaji’s (2000) studies is the familiarity with
presented stimulants do not change the IAT score. Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann,
and Banaji (2009) also found that the stimulants’ content does not influence test
results. Regardless of whether they employ a set of images or words, many inde-
pendent studies show no significant impact. In light of all these findings, the use
of IAT is seen as an effective way of assessing several types of individual attitudes.
The test is widely used in various areas and there is a growing interest in additive
methods combining implicit and explicit methods in political science (see Iyengar
and Westwood 2015; Maier et al. 2015; Ryan 2017; Theodoridis 2017). However,
related studies are very few in Turkish academic literature except for the field of
psychology.
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4. ARGUMENTS
The primary aim of this chapter is to highlight the main research questions and
hypotheses empirically assessed in this thesis and to outline the research design. In
the first half of this chapter, I present an overview of the study’s main goals. First,
I particularly focus on the question of whether implicit association affects attitudes
towards the EU. Second, I try to explore if implicit attitudes are influential in the
decision-making calculus of individuals when making their vote decisions. To test
these and the other related hypotheses, I use survey methods to measure individuals’
explicit attitudes and a computer-based test to explore their implicit attitudes to
see whether implicit attitudes bear predictive validity as the dual-process theory
suggests (Ksiazkiewicz and Hedrick 2013). Lastly, to find answers for the second
set of research questions, I use two different explicit measures to assess the in-group
and out-group favoritism within my sample and to empirically assess another set
of hypotheses concerning the relationship between individuals’ social identity and
system justification tendencies and implicit associations. I am especially curious
about whether there is a link between non-cognitive processes and political behavior
as a function of such attitudes.
In the second subsection of this chapter, I primarily concentrate on my research
design. As noted above, this study utilizes the Implicit Association Test (IAT)
(Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) and conventional survey methods. Hence,
this chapter includes details about how these measures correspond to theoretical
arguments and hypotheses raised in this chapter.
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4.1 Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses
Explicit and implicit attitudes are different in the ways that they are formed and
affect political behavior. Explicit attitudes are known as controlled and cognitively-
processed attitudes which are formed by long and repetitive thoughts, whereas im-
plicit attitudes are instantaneous reactions that are often stimulated by symbolic
objects that bear meaning to the individual (Strack and Deutsch 2004). However,
previous research suggests that these two types of attitudes are not completely de-
tached from each other. Rudman (2001) states that conscious, repetitive evaluations
of any concept may ignite automated responses. This may diminish the validity of
IAT and create distorted results. On the other hand, if the person is aware of her/his
uncontrolled attitude towards an issue, s/he can mix her implicit and explicit at-
titudes (Maier et al. 2015). Hence, we could expect implicit and explicit attitudes
to be correlated only to a moderate degree. Even though these concepts are mea-
sured by different methods and relate to contrasting mental processes, both aim to
measure the same fundamental association.
New studies in the context of pro-EU or Euroskeptical attitudes, with the inclusion
of implicit attitudes as a supplement or rival to the explicit attitudes, appear to be
superior to the models that include only one of the measures. The reasons behind
the inclusion of the implicit attitudes can be described in three ways in the Turkish
context. Firstly, the EU is an institution that does not directly interact with the
everyday lives of Turkish citizens. Therefore, Turkish citizens are expected to be
reluctant or indifferent towards the subjects related to the EU. Individuals might
thus be inclined to project their associations implicitly rather than explicitly. From
an attitudinal perspective, this might result in resorting to the implicit associations
to reflect their political opinions when asked. Secondly, as previously stated in the
literature, nationalistic, territorial inclinations can shape citizens’ attitudes towards
a more socially desirable political behavior in line with their national identity (An-
derson 2019). Implicit association measures are shown to be less prone to such social
desirability effects than are the conventional survey methods (Olson and Fazio 2004).
Thus, introducing both the implicit measure and the explicit survey items can help
reduce this effect to a certain degree.
Even though the introduction of implicit measures into political science research is
still recent, Iyengar and Westwood’s (2015) study shows that making use of implicit
attitudes in explaining political phenomena brings depth to public opinion research.
In their study, the authors show that implicit political bias is much more prevalent
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than the implicit racial bias. In this day and age, considering that political iden-
tities are rooted deeply in societies, implicit associations suggest the possibility of
a noteworthy explanation. Pérez (2010) states in his study on attitudes towards
immigrants that “implicit attitudes appear to be more group-specific in nature yet
nonetheless influential in political decision-making” (Pérez 2010, 539). Other stud-
ies also show the influence of implicit attitudes on political behavior, yet it is impor-
tant to note that the findings of the empirical studies regarding the power of such
influence are mixed (see Chapter 4). That is, there is no consensus on which mea-
sure is better. Hence the following hypothesis derives from that both measures tap
onto the same attitudes, however to differing extents. In general, it can be argued
that these two kinds of attitude measures are expected to correlate with each other,
but the magnitude of the relationship should not be very high, because a perfect
correlation would mean that there is no difference between these two.
H1: The implicit and explicit pro-EU attitudes will show a positive, but
moderate correlation.
4.1.1 Hypotheses Regarding the Social Identity Theory’s Propositions
In the previous chapters, it was pointed out that there are issues that are mea-
sured from a cognitive perspective such as rational-choice models may not work.
As Mclaren (2002) puts it, negative or positive attitudes towards the EU may stem
from some suppressed emotions of fear of “the Other” and hostility towards an un-
known culture rather than rational choice calculations of benefits of the EU. These
all make sense if we see the EU as not only a regulatory regional organization but as
a “policy-making organism” that enters the daily lives of citizens and impose certain
values and identity. From this perspective, the EU may be perceived by many as
a threat to their national identities. Therefore, my hypothesis builds on a line of
reasoning put forward by Risse (2003) and Carey (2002). Since these studies employ
data collected from European citizens, they measure an explicit European identity
and hypothesize on a “European identity” while my focus is on the Turkish national
identity. I will also examine the relationship between the identification with the
Turkish national identity and implicit attitudes towards the EU. The hypotheses
regarding national identity are as follows:
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H2: As an individual’s level of identification with the Turkish national
identity increases, his/her scores of explicit attitudes towards the EU
decrease.
H3: As the individual’s level of identification with the Turkish national
identity increases, his/her scores of implicit attitudes towards the EU
decrease.
Moreover, the idea that the EU may be perceived by many as a threat to their
national identities will be tested by using political party affiliations of Turkish youth,
and their implicit and explicit attitudes towards the in-group (i.e., Turkish identity).
In general, when compared with the relatively marginal parties (for example, HDP),
the Turkish national identity occupies a pivotal position in some parties’ political
identities and agendas (for example, MHP, CHP, and AKP). Therefore, the EU
should be seen as an identity-based threat by those who identify with relatively
centrist parties. As it is closely related to the suppressed emotions of fear felt
for the “Other”, I hypothesize that the implicit in-group favoritism is correlated
with the level of identification with the Turkish national identity, especially for the
supporters of a political party.
H4: For the supporters of a political party, the level of identification with
the Turkish national identity shows a positive and significant correlation
with the implicit attitudes towards Turkey.
4.1.2 Hypotheses Regarding the System Justification Tendencies
I also argue that a group of individuals’ attitudes towards the EU may change ac-
cording to their perceptions regarding the status boundaries in the socio-political
system of intergroup relations. The System Justification Theory posits that disad-
vantageous groups tend to legitimize the current systemic hierarchy by exhibiting
out-group favoritism, mostly in an implicit form. Because individuals who have a
high level of group identification, such as the national identity, tend to favor their
in-groups, we can hypothesize that those with a higher level of belongingness to the
Turkish national identity show more positive attitudes towards the EU, which is the
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out-group in this sense.
Perceptions about inter-group relations not only differ between high and low-status
groups but also within both groups. The stability, legitimacy, and permeability
simply refer to the perceptions regarding the out-group and the status of inter-group
relations. These are expected to depend on an individual’s or a group’s position
within the society. For instance, permeable group boundaries would indicate that
social mobility for a disadvantaged group is possible. Therefore, the status relations
are permeable. Correspondingly, the stable and legitimate perceptions of the status
relations would mean that collective action is unlikely for a lower status group. On
the other hand, a higher status group’s perception of stability and legitimacy would
imply security. The ideological standpoints of the groups are also imperative to
better understand such status structures. (Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008)
Therefore, I propose a set of hypotheses regarding the perceptions towards the legit-
imacy of the EU and permeability of the EU for the Turkish citizens in connection
with the explicit and implicit attitudes:
H5: The level of identification with the national identity and system jus-
tification tendencies in the forms of perceptions towards the legitimacy
and permeability of status and group boundaries between the EU and
Turkey are negatively correlated.
H6: Explicit attitudes towards the EU and system justification tenden-
cies in the forms of perceptions towards the legitimacy and permeability
of status and group boundaries between the EU and Turkey are posi-
tively correlated.
H7: Implicit attitudes towards the EU and system justification tenden-
cies in the forms of perceptions towards the legitimacy and permeability
of status and group boundaries between the EU and Turkey are posi-
tively correlated.
One of the major goals of political science research is to discover the determinants
of political behavior. As mentioned above, the implicit attitudes of individuals
have been proposed as an alternative to the conventional methods in capturing the
dynamics of political preferences and behavior. In this regard, it would also be
important to examine the impact of implicit attitudes on voting behavior. Thus,
I also test the relative strength of implicit and explicit attitudes in predicting the
preferences of individuals in a hypothetical referendum on Turkey’s EU membership.
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My hypothesis regarding the relative power of explicit and implicit attitudes in
predicting the votes in a potential EU membership referendum is as follows:
H8: Implicit attitudes towards the EU will have a stronger predictive
power than the explicit attitudes in predicting EU-related voting behav-
ior.
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5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
The data for this study were collected benefiting from a computer-assisted self-
interviewing (CASI) method and a follow-up implicit attitude test (IAT). The field-
work for this study was conducted in the spring of 2019 by the researcher and
using his two personal computers. A convenience sample of 247 respondents was
drawn taking into consideration the participants’ ages and party affiliations. The
parties were chosen according to the parliamentary representation of the parties of
which they are members of youth organizations, and the universities were chosen to
conduct comparable numbers of interviews from both private and public colleges.
88.26% of respondents in our sample are students, consisting of undergraduate and
master’s students, while the rest are recent university graduates. The participants
filled an online questionnaire, which included several explicit EU attitudes, parti-
sanship, and nationalism items. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to
take the IAT first, then the online-questionnaire, whereas the other half took the
online-questionnaire first. In total, 247 interviews were rated as of sufficient quality
and used in the analyses.
The online survey asks individual participants to evaluate the policy positions of
parties regarding the European Union. Since no single EU-attitude scale commonly
employed in cross-national studies is used to measure individuals’ attitudes toward
the EU, I used the set of questions from the latest Eurobarometer dataset that
was conducted in Turkey with Turkish citizens and was translated to Turkish (Eu-
ropean Commission 2009). In the questionnaire, various questions focus on the
different aspects of EU-Turkey relations and individual attitudes toward the EU. I
included questions that can gauge political support for the EU, as well. These ques-
tions include the evaluation of the EU’s policy positions on some of the controversial
issues in Turkey, such as the death penalty and education in mother-tongue.
Given that the Eurobarometer questionnaire did not include any questions about a
possible referendum on Turkey’s EU membership, I took the referendum question
from the Eurobarometer survey of (2003). The question’s wording is as follows: “If
there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of Turkey’s membership of
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the European Union, would you personally vote for or against it?” I believe it is a
very convenient survey item to assess this study’s main hypothesis that “[i]mplicit
attitudes towards the EU will have a stronger predictive power than the explicit
attitudes towards the EU in EU-related voting behavior.”
Demographic questions, nationalist attitudes, and political preferences of the par-
ticipants were the other items in the questionnaire. The questionnaire also included
items aiming to measure respondents’ knowledge about the EU and EU-related poli-
cies that are adopted or to be adopted by Turkey. To such end, I made use of the
The Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES 2018) Module 4’s demography
and party identification questions and International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP
2013) national identity questions. The questionnaires for both studies were available
in Turkish.
5.1 Sample
As noted above, the sample includes university students and members of the youth
branches of the four main legislative parties by employing a non-probability sampling
technique –i.e., convenience and purposive sampling. Participants from universities
were selected from the undergraduate and first-year graduate students of Sabanci
University, Uludag University, and Canakkale 18 Mart University (N=159) who
volunteered to take part in the study. These universities were chosen to ensure that
the sample includes students of both private and public universities. Figure 5.1
shows the distribution of the sample by universities and party youth members.
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Figure 5.1 Political Party and University Sub-samples
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Student samples do not always bear, or project partisan attitudes required for this
study’s goals, hence, the second half of the sample consists of the members of Turkish
political parties’ youth branches. The second half of the sample consisted of the
members of four main political parties’ youth branches (AKP, CHP, MHP, and
HDP; N=128) who were contacted with the help of the chairs of these branches.
The parties were chosen by taking account of legislative parties at the time of the
institutional review board application for survey data collection. As the legal age
limits for the youth-branch members of the parties range between 18 and 30, the
same criterion was also used for selecting the university sample. Party youth wings
were selected as the sample group because of their convenience and higher likelihood
of projecting partisan attitudes.
The ages of the participants range from 18 to 30 with a mean of 22.8 and a stan-
dard deviation of 2.26. (For women, mean=22.6, SD=2.08; for men, mean=22.96,
SD=2.4). Excluding the university sample, 31 of 128 participants were AKP mem-
bers, 33 were CHP members, 32 were HDP members, and 32 were MHP members.
Note that, during the post-survey adjustment phase, a total of three participants
who scored below the accuracy rate of .35 in the BIAT were dropped from the
sample. The analyses were thus conducted using a sample consisting of a total of
247 people.
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.685 0.465 0 1 213
Pro EU Attitudes 3.423 0.872 1.167 5 247
EU IAT Score -0.265 0.547 -1.402 1.143 247
EU Policy Support 5.951 2.581 0 10 243
Stability 3.206 0.796 1.333 5 243
Legitimacy 3.06 1.071 1 5 246
Permeability 3.111 1.073 1 5 247
National Identity 2.986 1.009 1 5 247
Ideology 4.485 3.026 0 10 233
5.2 Data Collection Tools
The research was conducted using the personal computers of the researcher. There-
fore, a Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI) software, SurveyMonkey, was
used as the intermediary to gather information from participants online andan adi-
tional program is used to measure implicit attitudes. The computer program is
called “Inquisit”, which is specifically designed to measure implicit favoritism. In
our study, it is designed to measure the favoritism between Turkey, and the Euro-
pean Union.
The questions and scales that were utilized during the research included demographic
and party identification questions, national identity scale (ISSP 2013), Stability, Le-
gitimacy and Permeability Scale (Mummendey et al. 1999, 267), and the set of
questions drawn from the Eurobarometer surveys to measure various EU-related
attitudes and preferences. The psychometric attributes of the scales in the ques-
tionnaire are explained in detail in the next subsections.
5.2.1 Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI)
Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing (CASI) questionnaires present survey items to
individual participants on computer monitors or device screens. The participants
use keyboards or touch-screens of their devices. CASI questionnaires are usually ad-
ministered using specialized software or online intermediaries that are programmed
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to present survey items and record the answers of individual respondents. CASI is
widely used given the recent advancements in technological tools and devices. With
CASI, recorded answers are easily translated into statistical formats and exported
as numeric responses. The CASI tool used in this study is SurveyMonkey. This
tool translates the data into a statistical format that is readable by software such
as STATA, Excel, or SPSS. The use of SurveyMonkey requires a computer and the
purchase of the software (Brown, Vanable, and Eriksen 2008).
There are many advantages of CASIs over traditional paper-and-pencil surveys or
face-to-face interviews. In a survey such as ours that involves complex and inter-
twined responses, it is important to minimize the extra unnecessary information.
Moreover, it is much faster and reliable if the respondent is not distracted by ir-
relevant questions. The computerized method makes it easier to branch questions,
assign logic related answers, and reduce worry with consistency checks. It is also
important to add that assessments made by CASI can increase the participant’s
conception that her answers and especially sensitive information remain confiden-
tial. This may enhance the perception that information remains confidential because
the researcher does not guide the process and cannot easily view the respondent’s
answers.
5.2.2 Implicit Association Test (IAT)
The implicit association test (IAT) is designed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwards
(1998, 1464) to study the implicit attitudes of individuals. It is argued in related
literature that these attitudes are unconsciously formed, yet can automatically af-
fect individual behavior (Greenwald et al. 2009). In studies that utilize the IAT
procedure, respondents are asked to categorize stimulants (images or words) into
two target categories in the fastest time possible with the least errors. After the
completion of a block, two items are paired with an attribute category and the
respondent is asked to pair these items with previously assigned positive or neg-
ative attribute categories. This proceeds interchangeably throughout seven blocks
of pairings. Finally, the latencies are calculated and the mean latency rates of the
pairings of each attribute, and target item are subtracted to calculate the implicit
association (Hofmann et al. 2005). The IAT’s theoretical background, procedure,
and advantages were explained in detail in Chapter 4.
The IAT test used in this study is a brief version. Given that the full version of
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the IAT takes more than 15 minutes to conduct, the brief version (called BIAT) is
found more convenient and appropriate for the task at hand. The brief version mea-
sures the exact, same association with fewer trials and is also a validated method.
I measure implicit association toward the EU or Turkey by using the implicit par-
tisan effect BIAT that Iyengar and Westwood (2015) initially created. I change
the images and words used by the partisan BIAT with EU- and Turkey-related im-
ages, and positive and negative stimulus words in Turkish. To such end, I use the
template of the partisan BIAT, because it also uses similar, contradictory concepts
(Democrat vs. Republican) to measure association in the US. I chose the images
of the EU and Turkey from the most popular, copyright-free images. “European
Union” and “Turkey” were the keywords searched via Google Images, and four dif-
ferent images were chosen from among the most popular images on the first page
of results. The words are the same as those used in Iyengar and Westwood’s re-
search, which are also the standard ones also used by the Harvard Implicit Project
(https://implicit.harvard.edu). However, after the feedback I received throughout
the pilot phase of the study, I decided to change target categories’ names from
“Good” and “Bad” to “Positive” and “Negative.” The instructions and commands
are also translated to Turkish. The images, words, and instructions employed in
this study are presented in Appendix A. The IAT was conducted using the “Inquisit
4 Lab” computer software. The program presents a “D-score” after each test. The
scores are calculated according to the latency differences of the pairings made by
each individual participant.
5.3 Questionnaire and Scales
5.3.1 EU-Attitude and Issue Specific Questions
To measure citizens’ explicit attitudes toward the EU, I respected the question
wordings in the Eurobarometer survey, which asked respondents to report their
perceptions and about their knowledge about the EU. Eurobarometer is considered
the gold standard in EU public opinion research. I utilized the questions from the
47
latest available Eurobarometer questionnaire on Turkey, which is the 2009 Spring
version (European Commission 2009).
To measure support for the EU, Eurobarometer includes a battery of questions.
The question items in the questionnaire are often asked as a battery to assess what
previous studies usually refers to as the “attitudes towards the EU”. Unlike the pre-
vious Eurobarometer surveys, the latest one does not ask the referendum question,
which is used as a dependent variable in this study. The latest Eurobarometer, on
the other hand, aims to measure individuals’ perceptions toward the EU in many
different dimensions, whereas this study only focuses on the basic battery on pro-EU
attitudes and certain issue-specific attitudes questions. Each EU attitude battery
item is presented to the participant on a five (5) point Likert scale (1= “I totally
disagree”; 5= “I totally agree”). The issue-related evaluation questions are on an
(11) eleven-point scale (0=”Totally Disagree agree”; 10= “Totally Agree”). The
questions are listed in the Appendix B.
Figure 5.2 Scree Plot of the Factor Solution of the EU Attitude Scale
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Pro-EU attitude questions were first analyzed via factor analysis. The items were
highly correlated and loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue score of 3.31.
Figure 5.2 shows the loading on the single factor. The Cronbach’s alpha (scale)
reliability score is .82 for the Pro-EU attitude scale. For the questions on the EU
knowledge, the items loaded on a single factor as well with an Eigenvalue score of
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3.30 and scale reliability of .83.
5.3.2 ISSP National Identity Scale
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is an annual survey program
that conducts cross-national surveys on various topics. ISSP’s (2013) “National
Identity III” module is the latest national identity module of the program (that
includes Turkey). The module includes a comprehensive battery of questions on
relevant socio-political topics ranging from group-membership to political participa-
tion. Carkoglu and Kalaycıoglu (Çarkoğlu 2014) present their findings from Turkey,
which included Turkish translations of the commonly used questionnaire. The study
provides us a series of items on nationalism, citizenship and national identity out of
which I use the national identity-battery in this study.
The questions in the ISSP’s National Identity module also included a set of questions
on group-membership and perceptions on the different dimensions of Turkish iden-
tity. Since our main aim in asking these questions is to measure national identity as
a form of social identity, survey items on other topics such as political efficacy, social
trust, immigration, and many others were not taken into account. Once again, each
item is presented to the respondents using a five (5) point Likert scale (1= “Disagree
Strongly”; 5= “Agree Strongly”).
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Figure 5.3 Scree Plot of the Factor Solution of the National Identity Scale
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The questions were later subjected to a principal component analysis as a six-item
scale. As shown in the Figure 5.3, the questions loaded onto a single factor with an
Eigenvalue score of 2.72 and with a Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of .83.
5.3.3 Status Stability, Status Legitimacy, and Group Permeability Scale
In order to examine the perceptions of Turkish youth about the relationship be-
tween Turkey and the EU, Mummendey and her colleagues’ (1999) “Status Stabil-
ity, Legitimacy, and Permeability Scale” was used in this study. The scale measures
individuals’ perceptions towards the stability, legitimacy, and permeability of the
status relationships of their own group with the help of a total of nine items (three
items for each of stability, legitimacy, permeability). Each item is presented to the
respondents on a five (5) point Likert scale (i.e., 1= “Totally Disagre” to 5= “To-
tally Agree”). I adjusted Verkuyten and Reijerse’s (2008) Turkish translation of
the Mummendey’s scale, used in a study focusing on the stability, legitimacy, and
permeability perceptions of the Turkish and Dutch people in the Netherlands. The
principal components analysis on the nine items of the scale reveals a two-factored
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structure with Eigenvalues higher than one. But as expected, three other questions
load onto a third factor that has an Eigenvalue value of .96. It is important to note
that, these three factors explain in turn 42%, 33%, and 23% of the total variance.
In line with the scree plot below, we can thus conclude that our findings are in line
with the theoretical expectations and findings in previous literature.
Figure 5.4 Scree Plot of the Factor Solution of the Stability, Legitimacy and Perme-
ability Scales
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These subscales’ reliability analyses show that their Cronbach’s alpha reliability
coefficients are in turn .54 for “Stability”, .69 for “Legitimacy,” and .77 for “Perme-
ability.” The reliability coefficients are lower than ideal, especially for the “Stability”
subscale. The reason is possibly related to the low number of questions used to con-
struct each scale (three for each). However, previous studies encountered similar
values, which were then used to construct the examined subscales (Mummendey
et al. 1999, 269). In this regard, rather than constructing a single scale I employ
these subscales seperately in the empirical analyses.
5.3.4 Control Variables
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Several control variables are included in the analyses to capture individual-level,
demographic determinants of voting behavior. I control for “Gender”, which is
coded as a binary variable marking female respondents. The distribution of gender
within the sample is close to ideal. From 247 participants, 131 (52.8%) are male
and 116 (47.2%) are female.
One of our main control variables is political ideology. In order to measure it, we
asked respondents to place themselves on an eleven-point scale ranging from “Left
(0)” to “Right (10)”. The mean of our sample is 4.48 with a standard deviation of
3.02.
Education is another control variable. It is an ordinal variable, ranging from 1 (Il-
literate/No formal education) to 9 (Doctorate complete). However, considering that
most respondents are university students, I do not expect any significant association
between education level and the variables of interest because of the lack of variation.
Income is also included among the control variables given that our sample includes
both public and private university students, and youth branch members. The de-
scriptive statistics show that there is sufficient variation in the sample. Moreover,
previous research suggests that income is related to individuals’ attitudes towards
the EU.
Participants’ religiosity levels were asked in the survey study as well. The wording of
the question was as follows: “Regardless of how many times you attend to religious
service, to what extent do you define yourself religious?” The question was asked on
a 4-point scale ranging from (0) “Not at all religious”, (1) “Not very religious”, (2)
“Somewhat religious” to (3) “Very religious”. The summary statistics of the control
variables are in the Appendix C (Table C.2 and C.3).
5.4 Data Collection Process
Before the data collection process, the present study was reviewed by the Sabancı
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) and approved by the Ethics Com-
mittee on April 13, 2019. Following the official approval, the data collection process
started in May 2019 and was finished in June 2019.
Participation was voluntary, and participants were not compensated in any form.
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After informing each participant about the research ethics and procedure, and get-
ting their consent, the researcher arranged interview dates for each participant.
Participants were provided with a silent office environment to fill the questionnaire
and take the BIAT test.
This procedure was, however, somewhat different for the youth branch members.
Given that each member was close to a different local municipality branch, by getting
the approval of party officials, the same environment was created in an appropriate
office in party buildings. Before the data collection, each participant was provided
with an “Information Approval Form” that includes information on the research’s
topic and rights of the participants. After the participant read and approved the
form by signing it, the procedure was initiated by the researcher. Each partici-
pant completed the questionnaires and tests individually and took approximately
20 minutes in total.
As mentioned above, the data collection tools were presented to the participants
in random order to minimize and balance any effects that could arise from their
ordering. This practice is important considering that the ordering could affect the
nature of the automatic cognitive process measured by the IAT.1 The instructions,
executional steps of the BIAT, and questionnaire are provided in Appendices A and
B.
5.5 Empirical Findings
First, I start by assessing the correlation between implicit and explicit measures.
The correlation between the implicit and explicit score is moderate but statistically
significant in the full sample (Pearson’s r = .416, p<0.001; N=247) and similar to
previous studies. Table 5.2 shows the correlations in the effective sample, which is
higher than those reported in Appendix C (Table C.1) (r= .459, N=202 for the full
sample; using pairwise deletion of cases with missing information).
Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between implicit and explicit EU attitudes in the
full sample. The dashed line shows the lowess smoother. Markers are jittered to
1We conducted a “One-Way ANOVA” analysis to find out if there were any effects that arose from the
ordering. The significance level(F= 1.25, p = .45). is below 0.05. and, therefore, there is not a statistically
significant difference in the ordering of the independent variable.
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show the distribution more clearly. As stated in the previous sections, weak explicit
attitudes may correlate with strong implicit attitudes. Hence, a disassociation be-
tween implicit and explicit attitudes is not unexpected. However, the figure shows
that there is not a substantial disassociation as expected. Still, we see observations
where implicit attitudes are strong while explicit attitudes are weak. On the other
hand, the markers colored according to reported partisan identification of respon-
dents do not show any readily observable patterns.
Figure 5.6 The Bivariate Relationship between Implicit EU Attitudes and Vote
Choice
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Figure 5.6 shows the bivariate relationship between the implicit EU attitudes and
the EU referendum vote choices. The table suggests a positive relationship between
the variables. The positive implicit EU attitude scores mostly associate with the
support for the EU membership, whereas the negative implicit EU attitude scores
completely associate with the opposing vote choices. The degree of association
suggests that the vote choice may be predicted from the IAT scores.
I then test the eighth hypothesis. To test which attitudinal measure has a stronger
predictive power, I use a logistic regression where the dependent variable is “EU
Referendum Vote Choice”. To reiterate, the survey item is as follows: “If there were
to be a referendum today on the question of Turkey’s membership to the European
Union, would you personally vote for or against it?”. The variable is binary and
takes following values: “0= I would vote against it”, and “1= I would vote for it.”. In
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order to assess each main independent variable’s effect individually, I estimate three
separate models on voting behavior in a hypothetical referendum. In the first model,
I look to the bivariate relationship between the implicit attitudes and potential EU
referendum vote. In the second model, I look to the effect of the explicit attitudes
on the potential EU referendum vote. In the third model, I included both implicit
and explicit measures to assess their relative predictive powers on the dependent
variable. Lastly, the fourth model includes explicit and implicit measures along
with the demographic control variables.
For the main analysis of this study, we continue with the second hypothesis. To
explain the potential membership referendum for the EU, we analyze whether the
implicit or explicit EU attitudes explain a higher percentage of the total variation
in intended vote choice. Overall, respondents had slightly higher pro-EU attitudes
than Euroskeptical attitudes (M=3.4, SD=.87). In general, respondents support
EU-related policy changes in Turkish domestic policy as well (M= 5.95, SD=2.58).
The mean value for the dependent variable of vote choice is .685 (SD= .465), meaning
that Turkish youth would support the EU membership if a referendum takes place
in the future (see Appendix C (Table C.2)) for detailed summary statistics). Even
though this study does not have a representative sample, these results correlate
with the recent major public opinion studies’ findings (European Commission 2009;
Kadir Has University 2017). Table 5.3 shows the logistic regression estimates on the
voting behavior in a potential referendum.
The likelihood ratio test suggests that the first model, replacing the implicit with
the explicit attitudes, provides a better fit to the data then does the second model.
The third model is the combined model that includes both implicit and explicit
measures as the independent variables. In Model 3, only the explicit attitudes are
significant predictors of voting behavior. The combined model’s fit does not show
any significant increase compared to the first model. The addition of the control
variables does not change the overall significance of explicit attitudes either. Implicit
attitudes toward the EU remain insignificant. Control variables also do not enhance
the fit of the model drastically (Log likelihood= -54.866787). Put differently, neither
the implicit attitudes nor the control variables could not predict the vote choice of
the Turkish youth. After controlling for implicit attitudes, the correctly classified
cases ratio does not change (86.38%). These results suggest that implicit measures
are redundant in this analysis when explicit measures are included.
Similar to previous studies, our additive model shows that the explicit measure has
higher predictive power. While the implicit attitudes in the implicit-only model
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Table 5.3 Logistic Regressions on Intended Vote Choice in a EU Membership Ref-
erendum
Explicit Model Implicit Model Combined Model Control Model
Explicit EU Attitudes 2.989*** 2.968*** 3.169***
(0.553) (0.566) (0.589)
Implicit EU Attitudes 0.599 0.402 0.108
(0.433) (0.543) (0.586)
EU Policy Support 0.200 0.501*** 0.166 0.291*
(0.133) (0.105) (0.137) (0.165)
Political Ideology 0.0764 0.125 0.0987 0.112
(0.134) (0.111) (0.137) (0.146)
AKP 1.503 -1.332* 1.646 1.502
(0.998) (0.752) (1.008) (1.049)
CHP 0.436 0.968 0.304 0.665
(0.768) (0.647) (0.786) (0.820)
MHP -0.147 -0.854 0.120 -0.257
(0.906) (0.771) (0.959) (0.988)
HDP 0.124 -0.151 -0.206 -0.415
(0.871) (0.758) (0.926) (0.923)
National Identity -0.334 -0.543
(0.343) (0.391)
Income -0.152
(0.124)
Gender(Female) -1.355*
(0.660)
Age -0.0363
(0.116)
Religiosity 0.267
(0.239)
Constant -10.82*** -2.309** -9.467*** -7.711**
(1.980) (0.994) (2.321) (3.651)
N 202 202 202 202
Log likelihood -58.574 -83.506 -57.867 -54.867
AIC 133.1 183.0 135.7 137.7
BIC 159.6 209.5 168.8 184.0
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
predicted voting behavior significantly on its own, in the combined model they do
not affect the vote decision. Moreover, the inclusion of the variable increases the
log-likelihood marginally.
To test the hypotheses related to the propositions of social identity theory, Turkish
national identity’s relationships with the explicit and implicit attitudes were exam-
ined from the correlation results in Table 5.2. As expected, the level of identification
with the Turkish national identity exhibited significant negative correlations with
the explicit (r=-.633, p < 0.001) and the implicit (r=-.378, p< 0.001) pro-EU atti-
tudes. These findings provide tentative support for hypotheses 2 and 3 by showing
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that, as the identification with the Turkish national identity increases, the support
for the EU decreases. The findings point to that individuals with a higher level of
identification with the Turkish national identity can be expected to be more inclined
to have negative and Euroskeptic attitudes, whereas individuals with a lower level
of identification tend to have more pro-EU attitudes.
Given that the measure of implicit attitudes has a scale ranging from -2 to +2, it
is important to note that it simultaneously measures the attitudes towards Turkey
as well. On the continuum, the pole of “-2” corresponds to a full association with
Turkey, while the pole of “+2” corresponds to a full association with the EU. Since
the measure produces estimates for both sides of the continuum, it is possible to eval-
uate the scores concerning the implicit attitudes towards Turkey as well. Therefore,
it was hypothesized that mass political parties in Turkey are attached to certain di-
mensions of the Turkish national identity and followers of these parties may project
positive implicit attitudes towards Turkey. Therefore, these implicit attitudes are
expected to be strongly correlated with higher levels of identification with the Turk-
ish national identity for political party supporters.
The correlation analysis show that, implicit attitudes has no significant correlation
with the Turkish national identity for supporters of each political party within our
sample. The reason may be the small sample sizes for each party. When the analysis
is conducted on the partisan sample (N=213), we see a negative and significant
overall correlation (r=-.363, p<0.001)(see Appendix C (Table C.8)). Furthermore,
when the same correlation analysis is conducted for the individuals who responded
only “Very close” to their closeness to a party on the questionnaire (n=138), the
correlation between explicit EU attitudes and national identity shows the highest
negative correlation. However, even for those strong partisans, explicit attitudes
show a much higher negative correlation (p=-.65, p<.001) than the implicit measure
(p=-.39, p<.001), whereas the negative correlation of pro-EU attitudes and national
identity scores is significant for both measures.
Consequently, we fail to reject the null for our fourth hypothesis for all the polit-
ical parties we examine. However, the partisan sample as a whole shows a strong
correlation in regards to national identity and implicit attitudes. All in all, we can
suggest that for individuals with high levels of partisanship, national identity and
implicit attitudes are somewhat related.
The hypotheses regarding the relationships between the explicit and implicit atti-
tudes towards the out-groups and the legitimacy of the inter-group status hierarchies
were tested via correlation analyses. First of all, as a reminder, the results above
show that (Table 5.2), as our first hypothesis suggests, explicit and implicit attitude
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scores have a significant, but moderate positive relationship (r=.459, p <.001). This
finding supports the conceptual distinction between explicit and implicit measures
by showing that, even though these two methods measure the same attitude, they
cannot be seen as merely the same measure. Therefore, there is some merit to use
them simultaneously in search of the dynamics behind social behaviors, including
the political ones.
Secondly, the explicit attitudes exhibit significant positive correlations with the per-
ceptions towards the legitimacy of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey
(r= .437, p<0.001). That is, as participants perceive the status boundaries as le-
gitimate, they tend to have positive explicit attitudes towards the EU. Similarly, as
the participants see the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey as perme-
able, they tend to have positive explicit attitudes towards the EU (r=.290, p<0.001).
These findings provide support for our sixth hypothesis. As for the implicit attitudes,
the findings show that these attitudes are positively and significantly correlated with
the legitimacy of status boundaries (r=.312, p<0.001). However, even though the
correlation between the implicit attitudes and the permeability is positive, it does
not reach statistical significance (r= .137). Therefore, hypothesis 7 is not supported.
In light of these findings, it can be concluded that the individuals who perceive
the status quo as legitimate, tend to have more pro-EU attitudes, in both implicit
and explicit forms. However, the perceptions towards the permeability of the status
boundaries are only correlated significantly with the explicit EU attitudes. Adding
to that, to find out which measure is a stronger to predictor of the legitimacy
and permeability of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey, I apply an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. I examine strong-partisan, weak-
partisan, and non-partisan groups to see if partisanship affects the understanding of
the status relations between the EU and Turkey. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the OLS
regression estimates.
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Table 5.4 The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes on the Legitimacy of the
Status Boundaries between the EU and Turkey
Non-Partisans Weak Partisans Strong Partisans Total
Explicit EU Attitudes 0.019 0.335 0.035 0.149
(0.321) (0.196) (0.114) (0.090)
Implicit EU Attitudes -0.090 0.172 0.289* 0.232*
(0.351) (0.224) (0.161) (0.119)
National Identity -0.066 -0.300* -0.537*** -0.426***
(0.213) (0.162) (0.101) (0.076)
Income 0.055 0.022 0.023 0.030
(0.093) (0.048) (0.041) (0.029)
Gender(Female) -0.185 -0.551** 0.035 -0.186
(0.319) (0.238) (0.175) (0.123)
Religiosity -0.117 -0.045 0.031 -0.013
(0.129) (0.088) (0.066) (0.047)
Constant 2.869 2.977*** 4.284*** 3.641***
(1.830) (1.110) (0.777) (0.579)
N 37 71 138 246
R2 0.121 0.301 0.362 0.303
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The OLS estimates show that the effect of implicit attitudes on the legitimacy of
the status boundaries between Turkey and the EU is conditional on the strength
of individual respondents’ partisan attitudes. Firstly, Table 5.4 shows that for non-
partisans, none of the variables are significant predictors of legitimacy. For weak
partisans, national identity and explicit EU attitudes explain legitimacy signifi-
cantly, while other variables except for gender fail to do so. For strong partisans,
national identity’s effect is both statistically and substantively significant. Implicit
attitudes are also statistically significant predictors for the dependent variable. Ex-
plicit attitudes remain insignificant for each of the three groups.
Table 5.5 shows the estimates on the perceptions towards the permeability of the
status boundaries. The regression estimates suggest that only explicit EU attitudes
predict permeability of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey, for each
level of partisanship. For non-partisans, none of the variables explain the perme-
ability perceptions. Explicit attitudes are statistically and substantively significant
for both strong and weak partisans.
The findings from the additional regression analyses reported in models entitled
“total” in Table 5.4 that, in the full sample, participants’ perceptions towards the
legitimacy of the status boundaries between the EU and Turkey could also be pre-
dicted by their level of identification with the national identity and their implicit
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Table 5.5 The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes on the Permeability of the
Status Boundaries between the EU and Turkey
Non-Partisans Weak Partisans Strong Partisans Total
Explicit EU Attitudes 0.052 0.496** 0.363*** 0.395***
(0.387) (0.227) (0.132) (0.104)
Implicit EU Attitudes 0.068 0.019 0.050 -0.011
(0.417) (0.259) (0.185) (0.137)
National Identity 0.281 0.212 0.103 0.105
(0.263) (0.188) (0.116) (0.088)
Income 0.076 0.005 -0.017 -0.001
(0.116) (0.056) (0.047) (0.033)
Gender(Female) 0.298 -0.150 -0.198 -0.062
(0.399) (0.276) (0.202) (0.141)
Religiosity -0.168 0.026 -0.022 -0.022
(0.154) (0.102) (0.076) (0.054)
Constant 1.697 0.858 1.762* 1.531**
(2.268) (1.285) (0.893) (0.668)
N 38 71 138 247
R2 0.068 0.095 0.081 0.077
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
attitudes. However, only the explicit attitudes were able to explain the variation in
the permeability scores, as seen in Table 5.5, in the full sample.
With regard to the partisan attitudes of participants, we came across with a rather
different and interesting pattern that neither the social identity nor the implicit and
explicit attitudes were able to explain significant variation in the legitimacy and
permeability scores of non-partisans, whereas the national identity and the implicit
attitudes explain an important part of the variation in strong partisans’ perceptions
about the legitimacy of status boundaries. To reiterate, for the weak partisans, it
was only the national identity that explained their legitimacy scores whereas their
permeability scores were predicted only by their explicit pro-EU attitudes.
The findings for the strong partisans imply that perceptions towards the EU are
shaped especially by their identifications with the national identity and subconscious
attitudes towards the EU. We believe that these findings can be seen as additional
evidence pointing to the importance of implicit attitudes in the issue of the EU-
Turkey relationship.
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The main aim of this study is to examine the extent to which their implicit and ex-
plicit attitudes towards the EU would influence the voting behavior of Turkish youth
in a possible referendum for Turkey’s membership to the EU. The impact of these
different sorts of attitudes on vote choice was assessed based on a series of hypothe-
ses derived from two rival social psychological theories, namely social identity, and
system justification theories. Both theories aim to explain inter-group relations. As
mentioned above, social identity theory focuses on the possibility of change in social
hierarchies, whereas system justification theory aims to explain why such hierarchies
tend to stay stable and legitimate. Using these rival explanations allow us to study
the elusive dynamics of Turkish people’s perceptions about the relationship between
the EU and Turkey. As this relationship can be characterized by some periods of
stability and sudden changes over the course of Turkey’s candidacy, such theoretical
frameworks are valuable in understanding the volatile nature of the public opinion
on this matter.
First of all, it should be noted that even in this period of deteriorating relations, the
support for the EU membership in this study’s sample of Turkish youth is still high.
Although the sample is not a representative one, it would not be completely wrong
to evaluate this finding as a good sign for the future of the EU-Turkey relationship.
However, the empirical analyses in our study point to that, even though the overall
support is high, there is still considerable variance in Turkish youth’s attitudes
towards the EU. This necessitates a detailed analysis of their preferences in the
long run. It is obvious that such an analysis should include political and social
psychological variables measured simultaneously, preferably coupled with a strong
theoretical framework.
The findings of the present study suggest that the Turkish national identity occu-
pies a pivotal place in shaping the perceptions and preferences of Turkish youth
towards the EU. As the level of the identification of the youth with the Turkish
national identity increases, both the explicit and implicit pro-EU attitudes tend to
decrease. Given the well-known prominence of the national identities as political
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leverage in nearly all political systems of the world, this finding may not come as a
surprise. It is possible to note that national identity helps an individual categorize
himself/herself in the dichotomy of “us” and “other”, as long suggested by social
identity theoreticians.
Broadly speaking, our findings point to that perceptions and attitudes of the Turkish
youth towards the EU are largely formed based on national identity. Therefore, it
would be plausible to expect that they would be quite sensitive to any change in the
discourse on the EU in everyday politics. Any attempt by political elites that makes
the distinction between the Turkish national identity and the EU more salient would
strengthen the “us” and “them” dichotomy and, consequently, reduce the support to
the EU. I believe such attempts that are encountered frequently in daily politics are
one of the factors that keep the level of support low. Turkish youth for whom their
national identity is more prevalent perceive the EU as the “other” or an out-group.
This finding is in line with the popular expression that the EU is perceived by the
Turkish public as a “Christian club.” However, the findings regarding the effect of
implicit attitudes on pro-EU attitudes suggest that a highly valued national identity
seems to be deeply rooted in the minds of individuals even at an unconscious level.
One way of overcoming potential problems associated with this finding can be sug-
gested by using the social identity theory’s basic propositions. For the proponents
of this theory, the cognitive process of social categorization creates prejudice and
discrimination between groups, as it enhances the differences between the in- and
out-groups. If members of rival groups could be able to categorize themselves under
the same categories, their perceptions towards each other would be more positive.
By differentiating between three levels of self-categorization (personal, group, and
humanity), Turner turner1999 suggested that categorizing the self and the other
into the category of humanity would decrease the negative effects of divisive so-
cial categorization Therefore, the content of political discourse is very decisive for
individuals to develop positive perceptions and attitudes towards the “other”. To
my knowledge, the present study is the first attempt to show that Turkish people’s
perceptions towards the EU may have an automatic, unconscious form, as well as
an explicit form frequently measured in survey research.
I was able to show that this was also the case with the followers of the political
parties that are known for their use of the national identity as an anchor for shaping
their political identities. The study’s sample included supporters of four legisla-
tive Turkish political parties –AKP, CHP, MHP, and HDP. Partisan identification
with the AKP, CHP, and MHP are positively correlated with a positive national
identity, whereas, as expected, we find a negatively correlation for HDP support-
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ers. As the Turkish national identity is not a defining feature in HDP’s political
identity, this finding may be evaluated as yet another supporting evidence for our
argument. Another important finding was regarding the differences partisanship
brings to attitudes. It is shown that strong partisans demonstrate more implicit
and national-identity based decisions rather than conscious, rational ones. As im-
plicit scores show the degree of association with the Turkish identity as well, based
on these findings one can state that it is possible to expect that national identities
will remain at the center of the stability of the possible schism between the publics
of the EU and Turkey.
The most important finding of the present study is about the examination of the
basic determinants of the vote choice of the Turkish youth in a possible referendum
for Turkey’s membership to the EU. The findings from the regression analysis of
voting intentions of respondents show that implicit attitudes, only when entered
alone in the equation, were able to predict significant variance in voting preferences.
That is, as respondents with more positive implicit attitudes towards the EU tend to
vote in favor of the membership. However, the effect of implicit attitudes disappear
when explicit pro-EU attitudes were introduced to the regression model (with or
without other control variables of gender, income, and religiosity), suggesting that
explicit attitudes are much more powerful in predicting electoral behavior. Similar
findings regarding the relatively stronger explanatory power of explicit attitudes
than the implicit ones were also presented in other research (Maier et al. 2015;
Raccuia 2016; Theodoridis 2017). Nonetheless, I believe the finding that implicit
attitudes explain significant variance in the dependent variable alone is a promising
finding for future research.
Both social identity and system justification theories assume that individuals try to
understand the complexity of social systems by developing some general explana-
tions regarding the nature of those systems. Perceptions about the status boundaries
between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in terms of their legitimacy, stabil-
ity, and permeability constitute the bases of the general beliefs about the social
structure. The empirical findings regarding the relationship between perceptions
towards the social system and the national identity suggest that, as Turkish youth
have positive explicit pro-EU attitudes, they tend to perceive the status boundaries
as legitimate and permeable. A somewhat similar pattern was observed concerning
the effect of implicit attitudes at a subconscious level.
Our findings point out that the main phenomenon of interest in the system justifi-
cation theory (i.e., implicit out-group favoritism) has strong relevance in explaining
Turkish youth’s perceptions towards the EU-Turkey relationship, together with that
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of the social identity theory (i.e., identification with the in-group). In line with the
propositions of the system justification theory, implicit pro-EU attitudes help ex-
plain perceptions of the legitimacy of the status boundaries between the EU and
Turkey. This finding implies that if the respondent perceives the EU positively, it
is quite likely that s/he would see the status inequalities as legitimate.
It is quite clear that such an evaluation of the inequalities run counter to the
common-sense explanation of the issue, as it implies that one may think or behave
against the interests of his/her in-group. The originality of the system justification
theory’s propositions comes into the picture here: as the system justification theo-
reticians Jost, Banaji Nosek (2004) put it, theories emphasizing the importance of
in-group favoritism (“group justification theories”, including social identity theory)
fail to cover the importance of out-group favoritism that function as an individual-
level factor in maintaining the inequalities in social systems. As individuals have
a basic tendency to justify the illegitimate and unjust nature of status boundaries,
they also tend to favor powerful and advantaged out-groups over their disadvan-
taged in-groups. In the context of the EU-Turkey relationship, this explanation
seems relevant at least for some individuals: those who do not identify with their
in-group (the Turkish national identity) tend to view the EU in a positive light
by exhibiting implicit favoritism towards the out-group. The findings demonstrat-
ing that implicit pro-EU attitudes have a significant negative relationship with the
level of identification with the national identity provide empirical support for this
conclusion.
This study is a mere attempt to go beyond the limits of descriptive analyses of
Turkish youth’s attitudes towards the EU. Unlike most of the previous research, we
focus on vote choices of Turkish youth by informing our expectations by prominent
social-psychological theories. Another important contribution of this study to lit-
erature comes from its use of explicit and implicit measures simultaneously. Our
findings suggest that there is merit in utilizing the two types of attitude measures
in examining EU support. A rather indirect contribution to the relevant literature
is the finding regarding the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes: a
moderate correlation between these two measures implies that these variables are
associated with different aspects of the same attitude. However, the size of the cor-
relation is not large enough to warrant that they are the same. The existence of a
certain degree of disassociation between the two measures suggests that while one
is inadequate, the other one can substitute it.
I believe the contributions of the findings and the methods of the present study
are not limited to the literature on the Turkey-EU relationship. As recent research
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in other countries has shown, exploring the subconscious determinants of political
behavior may pave the way for a new and promising interdisciplinary approach for
understanding the dynamics of political indifference and ambivalence. Together with
social identities such as national or ethnic identities, the use of implicit attitudes
may help scholars better understand the political preferences of the Turkish public
that are resistant to change. Given the polarized nature of the Turkish public in
both the social and political realms, it can be argued that such a research strategy
promises new solutions for explaining attitudinal and behavioral preferences.
Turkish youth’s attitudes do not drastically differ from the public’s opinion. In this
study’s sample, we see individuals with high and low attachments to the national
identity and group interests. Their polarizing views about the EU are not different
from the polarized political atmosphere within Turkey. The complex and never-
ending process with the EU does not help the domestic discussions on Europe and
West, in general. The hostile representation of Europe by certain media channels
in Turkey, declining enthusiasm from EU membership, and even hostility towards
particular political groups in the last few years might be the reason why individuals
turn to more sensitive explanations such as national identity and symbolic politics
(Arikan 2012, 97)
This study shows that national identity is a reference point when people try to
understand things they do not know or simply cannot comprehend. The symbolic
politics feed national identities and determine how people evaluate the EU and to an
extent “West”. However, the overall support of the Turkish youth for the EU is still
an important reason to keep the relations alive. Furthermore, the important role
of symbolic concerns and group ideology can also act as a driver of more positive
relations.
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APPENDIX A
BIAT Design and Instructions
I used the standard set of positive and negative stimuli for both the EU and Turkey
BIAT as well as images that represent and may stimulate Turkey and the EU. Here
I present the images and stimulus words together with their Turkish translations
that I used in the study:
Positive affective stimuli: “Wonderful, Best, Superb, Excellent “,
Turkish: “Keyif, Sevgi, Huzur, Muhteşem”
Negative affective stimuli: “Terrible, Awful, Horrible, Worst”, Turk-
ish: “Berbat, Korkunç, Çirkin, Rezalet”
To instruct the participants about the testing process I slightly adjusted the instruc-
tion text used in the Partisan BIAT study by Iyengar and Westwood (2015) and
adapted it the EU-Turkey context, later translated it into Turkish. Here I present
the instructions that were given to the participants before the BIAT, together with
their Turkish translations:
English:
“In this task, you will be instructed to press the ‘P’ key for ‘POSITIVE’ words
and images from one specific group, either EU or TURKEY. The ‘Q’ key is used
for ‘NEGATIVE’ words and images from the other group.Press the ‘P’ key for all
items that belong to the categories at the top of the page. Press the ‘Q’ key for
everything else.The first items will help you get used to the task format. Classify
items as quickly as you can while making. Make as few mistakes as possible. Going
too slow or making too many mistakes will result in an uninterpretable score. It is
OK to make an occasional mistake. If you press an incorrect key you will see a red
‘X’. Rapidly correct the error by pressing the other key.”
Turkish:
“Bu görevde, ekrana olumlu (örn. keyif) veya olumsuz (örn. berbat) kelimelerin yanı
sıra AB ya da Türkiye ile ilişkili resimler gelecektir. Sizden beklenen, ekranda be-
liren kelimeler ve resimler karşısında, sunulacak talimatlara uygun bir biçimde, “P”
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Stimuli Images
ve “Q” tuşlarına basmanızdır. İlk birkaç deneme, uygulamaya alışmanızı sağlaya-
caktır. Mümkün olduğu kadar hızlı cevaplandırın ve hata yapmamaya çalışın. Testi
çok yavaş cevaplamanız ya da çok fazla hata yapmanız sonuçların yorumlanama-
masına neden olacaktır. Nadir yapılan hatalar önemli değildir. Eğer yanlış bir tuşa
basarsanız kırmızı bir ’X’ işareti ile karşılaşacaksınız. Hızlıca doğru tuşa basarak
hatayı düzeltiniz.”
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Scoring Procedure
The procedure produces a “D-score” that is used to interpret BIAT results. The score
ranges from -2 to 2. The scores are the differences in the mean response times of the
paired target categories divided by the pooled standard deviation over each block.
Category A (EU) and Category B (Turkey) are alternately paired with positive
and negative words. The participants pair Category A and B via the instructions
given before each block. Full scoring steps are adapted from Iyengar and Westwood
(Iyengar and Westwood 2015):
1.First two blocks are trial blocks and not scored.
2.Only the data from block 3 to 6 are used.
3.Trials with latencies higher than 10,000 ms are eliminated.
4.Subjects who scored 10% of trials with a latency less than 300 ms are eliminated.
5.Mean of accurate latency of each block is calculated.
6.Pooled standard deviation for all trial rounds are computed.
7.Differences between the appropriate scores are computed for each round.
8.Differences are divided by the standard deviation that is used in the step 6.
9.Do not use cases that showed higher error rate than 35%.
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APPENDIX B
Questionnaire Items
EU Attitude Question Items
Avrupa Birliği’ne güvenirim.
Benim fikirlerim Türkiye’de dikkate alınmaktadır.
Genel olarak bakıldığında, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne girmesi iyi bir şeydir.
Genel olarak bakıldığında, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne girmesi ülkemiz açısından
fayda sağlar.
Genel olarak bakıldığında, Avrupa Birliği’nin gözümdeki imajı olumludur.
Türkiye, AB yerine, Ortadoğu’daki müttefikleri ile daha yakın olmaya öncelik
vermelidir.
Avrupa Birliği’nin geleceği hakkında, çok mu iyimsersiniz, oldukça mı iyimsersiniz,
oldukça mı kötümsersiniz, yoksa çok mu kötümsersiniz?
Çok iyimser
Oldukça iyimser
Oldukça kötümser
Çok kötümser
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Peki, 2030’da Avrupa Birliği’nde, insanlar etnik ve dini azınlıklara karşı daha
hoşgörülü mü yoksa daha hoşgörüsüz bir toplumda mı yaşayacak?
Daha hoşgörülü
Daha hoşgörüsüz
Hiçbir şey değişmeyecek, bugünün toplumuyla aynı olacak
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Sizin görüşünüze göre, Avrupa Birliği dünyada insan haklarını teşvik etmek ve savun-
mak adına çok fazla mı çalışma yapıyor, yeteri kadar mı çalışma yapıyor, yoksa
yaptıkları yetersiz mi kalıyor?
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Çok fazla
Yeteri kadar
Yetersiz
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Bugün yapılacak bir halk oylamasıda siz, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği için mi, yoksa
karşısında mı oy kullanırdınız?
AB üyeliğini destekler yönde oy kullanırdım
AB üyeliğine karşı yönde oy kullanırdım
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
EU Related Policy Support Rating Scale
Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olmak için her türlü fedakarlıkta bulunulmalıdır.
Avrupa Birliği’ne giden süreçte Alevilerin kimliklerini korumalarını kolaylaştıran
düzenlemeler yapılmalıdır.
Avrupa Birliği’ne giden süreçte vatandaşların Türkçe dışındaki anadillerini
öğrenebilmelerine imkan sağlayan yasaların çıkması iyi olmuştur.
Avrupa Birliği’ne giden süreçte Türkçe dışındaki ana dillerde radyo ve televizyon
yayınları yapılmasına imkan sağlayan yasaların çıkması iyi olmuştur.
Avrupa Birliği’ne giden süreçte ordunun Türkiye siyasetindeki rolünü kısıtlayan
yasaların çıkması iyi olmuştur.
Avrupa Birliği’ne giden süreçte idam yasasının her suç ve herkes için kaldırılması
iyi olmuştur.
Stability, Legitimacy and Permeability Scale
Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişki önümüzdeki yıllarda aynı şekilde devam
edecektir.
Avrupa, Türkiye’den daha iyi durumda olmayı hak ediyor.
Ne yaparsa yapsın, Türkiye’li biri asla bir Avrupa’lı olarak kabul göremez.
Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin şimdiki durumu sadece geçicidir.
Türkiye’nin (Avrupa’ya kıyasla) daha kötü durumda olması haksızlıktır.
Türkiyeli birinin Avrupalı olarak kabul görmesi hiç zor değildir.
Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki ilişki kolay kolay değişmeyecektir.
Haklı olarak Avrupa, şu anda Türkiye’den daha iyi durumdadır.
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Türk birinin Avrupalı olarak kabul görmesi neredeyse imkansızdır.
ISSP National Identity Scale
Türkiye hakkında öyle şeyler var ki benim bugün Türkiye’den utanmama sebep
oluyor.
Eğer başka ülkelerin vatandaşları da, Türk’ler gibi olsaydı; dünya daha iyi bir yer
olurdu.
Genel olarak, Türkiye çoğu dünya ülkesinden daha iyi bir ülkedir.
Ülkesi yanlış şeyler yapsa da, insan ülkesini desteklemeye devam etmelidir.
Ülkem uluslararası spor müsabakalarında başarılı olduğu zaman, Türk olmaktan
gurur duyuyorum.
Genel olarak, Türkiye ile gurur duymak istediğimden daha az gurur duyuyorum.
Economy-related Items
Geçtiğimiz 1 (bir) yıl içinde iş başındaki hükümetin izlemiş olduğu politikalar sizce
ailenizin ekonomik durumu üzerinde nasıl bir etki yaptı?
Peki, yine benzer bir cetvel üzerinde geçtiğimiz 1 (bir) yıl içinde iş başındaki
hükümetin izlediği politikaların Türkiye ekonomisi üzerindeki etkilerini değer-
lendirirmisiniz?
Partisanship Battery
Kendinizi herhangi bir siyasi partiye yakın görüyor musunuz?? Evet
Hayır
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Kendinizi bir partiye diğerlerine göre daha yakın hisseder misiniz?
Evet
Hayır
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Kendinizi hangi partiye yakın hissediyorsunuz?
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP/Ak Parti – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan)
Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP - Pervin Buldan/Sezai Temelli)
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Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP – Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu)
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP – Devlet Bahçeli)
Saadet Partisi (SP – Temel Karamollaoğlu)
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Diger:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........
Kendinizi bu partiye çok mu yakın hissediyorsunuz, biraz mı yakın, ya da pek yakın
değil mi? Çok yakın
Biraz yakın
Pek yakın değil
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Siyasette insanlar bazen sağ’dan ve sol’dan bahsederler. Size vereceğim 0’ın en solu,
10’un ise en sağı gösterdiği cetvelde . . . . . . . . . Partisini nereye yerleştirirsiniz
Aynı cetveli kullanarak . . . . . . partisini nereye koyardınız?
“Sol-Sağ”ı hiç duymadı
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum/Nereye yerleştireceğini bilemedim
Cevap yok
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
Halkların Demokratik Partisi
İyi Parti
Saadet Partisi
Peki bu cetvelde kendinizi nereye koyardınız?
“Sol-Sağ”ı hiç duymadı
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Peki, bu ifadelere siyasi partiler sizce ne derece katılıyorlardır? Lütfen her bir parti
için aşağıdaki rakamlara göre ayrı ayrı cevap veriniz.
Fikrim Yok/Bilmiyorum
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Cevap Yok
Türkiye, AB’den bağımsız olarak, Kıbrıs konusunda kendi çıkarlarını korumalıdır.
Türkiye dış politikasını Avrupa’ya yoğunlaştıracağına, farklı coğrafyalarda alter-
natif politikalara yönlerdirmelidir.
AB uyum yasaları çerçevesinde hazırlanmış toplumun milli ve manevi duygu-
larına ters düşen yasalar yeniden düzenlenmelidir.
Türkiye AB üyeliği için gerekli reformları hayata geçirmelidir.
Demographic Information Form
Cinsiyetiniz?
Erkek
Kadın
Doğum YILINIZI öğrenebilir miyim? [4 rakamlı olarak yazın (örn: 1975)]
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Sahip olduğunuz en yüksek eğitim seviyesinin ne olduğunu söyleyebilir misiniz?
Okuryazar değil, hiçbir resmi eğitim almamış
Okuryazar ancak diploması yok
İlkokul mezunu (5 yıllık)
Ortaokul mezunu/İlköğretim mezunu (8 yıllık ilköğretim ya da 5 yıl sonrası 3
yıllık ortaokul mezunu)
Lise mezunu
Lise’den mezun olup yükseköğretime devam etmiş ama bitirememiş.
Üniversite mezunu
Yüksek lisans (Master)
Doktora
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Halen, kazanç karşılığı herhangi bir işte çalışıyor musunuz?
Halen kazanç karşılığı bir işte tam zamanlı olarak çalışıyorum (haftada 32 ya da
daha fazla saat) S38’e geçin
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Halen kazanç karşılığı bir işte yarı zamanlı olarak çalışıyorum (haftada 15 ila 32
saat arası) S38’ye geçin
Halen para karşılığı bir işte haftada 15 saatten az çalışıyorum S38’e geçin
Aile üyelerine yardım ediyorum (Ücretsiz aile işçisi) S38’e geçin
ÇalışmıyorumS37’ye geçin
Şimdi sayacaklarımdan hangisi size en uygun olanıdır?
İşsiz / İş arıyor, bulsa çalışmak istiyor S40’a geçin
Öğrenci S40’a geçin Çırak, iş eğitimi alıyor S40’a geçin
Hasta, engelli, sakat S40’a geçin
Emekli S40’a geçin
Ev kadını S40’a geçin
Diğer S40’a geçin
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Mesleğiniz nedir? Yani ana işinizin ismi nedir ya da ünvanınız nedir?
Yazınız:
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Kendiniz için okuyacaklarımdan hangisi en uygun olanıdır?
Beyaz yakalı çalışan
İşçi
Çiftçi
Serbest meslek sahibi
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Medeni halinizi öğrenebilir miyim?
Evli ya da evliymiş gibi biriyle birlikte yaşıyor
Dul
Boşanmış
Nişanlı
Ayrı (hukuken evli fakat eşinden ayrı yaşıyor)
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Bekar
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Siz bir dine bağlı mısınız?
Hayır, hiçbir dine bağlı değilim S45’e geçin
Evet, Müslüman’ım S42’ye geçin
Evet, Hıristiyan’ım S44’e geçin
Evet, Musevi’yim S44’e geçin
Diğer:.... S42’ye geçin
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum S42’ye geçin
Cevap yok S42’ye geçin
Sünni Müslüman mısınız?
Evet Sünni Müslümanım
Hayır Sünni Müslüman değilim S43’e geçin
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum S43’e geçin
Cevap yok S43’e geçin
Peki, Alevi misiniz?
Evet Aleviyim
Hayır Alevi değilim
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Ne sıklıkta ibadet ettiğinize bakmaksızın, kendinizi ne derece dindar biri olarak
görürsünüz?
Hiç dindar değilim
Pek dindar değilim
Biraz dindarım
Çok dindarım
Fikrim yok/Bilmiyorum
Cevap yok
Şimdi size okuyacağım dillerden hangilerini konuşabiliyorsunuz?
Evet, konuşabiliyorum
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Hayır, konuşamıyorum
Çocukluğunuzda anne veya babanızla, günlük görüşme ve konuşmalarınızda hangi
dili veya dilleri konuşurdunuz?
Türkçe
Kürtçe
Arapça
Almanca
İngilizce
Diğer
Geçtiğimiz altı ayı dikkate alırsanız, bütün aile fertlerinin maaş, kira, emekli
aylığı v.b. gelirlerini göz önünde bulundurarak ortalama toplam aylık hane halkı
gelirinizin şu sayacağım gruplardan hangisine en yakın olduğunu söyler misiniz?
150TL ve altı
151-250
251-350
351-450
451-550
551-750
751-1000
1001-1500
1501-2000
2001-3000
3001-5000
5001-7000
7001-9000
9001-11000
11001TL ve üstü
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APPENDIX C
Figure C.1 Income
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Figure C.2 Religiosity
	
0	20	
40	60	
80	100	
120	
Not	at	All	 Slightly	Religious	 Moderately	Religious	 Religious	 Very	Religious	
How	religious	are	you?	
88
Figure C.3 Potential Referendum Vote
31.46%
68.54%
Against EU Membership
For EU Membership
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Table C.2 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.685 0.465 0 1 213
Pro-EU Attitudes 3.423 0.872 1.167 5 247
EU IAT Score -0.265 0.547 -1.402 1.143 247
EU Policy Support 5.951 2.581 0 10 243
Legitimacy 3.06 1.071 1 5 246
Permeability 3.111 1.073 1 5 247
National Identity 2.986 1.009 1 5 247
Ideology 4.485 3.026 0 10 233
AKP 0.146 0.354 0 1 247
CHP 0.332 0.472 0 1 247
MHP 0.146 0.354 0 1 247
HDP 0.198 0.4 0 1 247
Weak Partisan 0.887 0.317 0 1 240
Strong Partisan 0.559 0.498 0 1 247
Gender(Female) 0.47 0.5 0 1 247
Age 22.806 2.262 19 30 247
Income 11.777 2.098 1 15 247
Religiosity 2.267 1.029 1 4 247
Table C.3 Summary Statistics for the Effective Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.688 0.464 0 1 202
Explicit EU Attitudes 3.477 0.921 1.167 5 202
Implicit EU Attitudes -0.224 0.561 -1.402 1.143 202
EU Knowledge 6.135 2.645 0 10 202
Legitimacy 3.127 1.118 1 5 202
Permeability 3.097 1.079 1 5 202
National Identity 2.957 1.042 1 5 202
Political Ideology 4.366 2.993 0 10 202
AKP 0.144 0.352 0 1 202
CHP 0.342 0.475 0 1 202
MHP 0.149 0.356 0 1 202
HDP 0.228 0.42 0 1 202
Weak Partisan 0.905 0.293 0 1 202
Strong Partisan 0.584 0.494 0 1 202
Gender(Female) 0.421 0.495 0 1 202
Age 22.985 2.297 19 30 202
Income 11.792 2.194 1 15 202
Religiosity 1.946 1.383 0 4 202
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Table C.4 Summary Statistics for AKP supporters
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.406 0.499 0 1 32
Pro EU Attitudes 2.493 0.804 1.167 5 36
EU Policy Support 4.648 2.039 0.333 10 36
IAT Score -0.451 0.505 -1.349 0.893 36
Legitimacy 2.269 0.839 1 4.667 36
Permeability 2.87 1.107 1 5 36
National Identity 3.973 0.797 1.833 5 36
Political Ideology 8.029 1.944 5 10 33
Gender(Female) 0.472 0.506 0 1 36
Age 22.667 2.438 19 30 36
Income 10.833 2.613 1 15 36
Religiosity 3.083 1.079 0 4 36
Table C.5 Summary Statistics for CHP supporters
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.847 0.362 0 1 72
Pro EU Attitudes 3.814 0.593 2.167 5 82
EU Policy Support 6.438 2.001 0 10 80
IAT Score -0.188 0.558 -1.138 1.143 82
Legitimacy 3.335 1.029 1 5 82
Permeability 3.348 0.913 1 5 82
National Identity 2.666 0.737 1 4.5 82
Political Ideology 3.063 1.786 0 8 79
Gender(Female) 0.573 0.498 0 1 82
Age 23.341 2.3 19 27 82
Income 12.39 1.676 9 15 82
Religiosity 1.537 1.178 0 3 82
Table C.6 Summary Statistics for MHP Supporters
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.3 0.466 0 1 30
Pro EU Attitudes 2.719 0.846 1.167 4.333 36
EU Policy Support 3.023 2.008 0 8.667 36
IAT Score -0.608 0.466 -1.402 0.685 36
Legitimacy 2.454 1.161 1 5 36
Permeability 2.639 1.296 1 5 36
National Identity 3.949 0.711 1.5 5 36
Political Ideology 8.028 2.035 1 10 36
Gender(Female) 0.083 0.28 0 1 36
Age 21.778 2.231 19 27 36
Income 11.944 1.672 8 15 36
Religiosity 2.75 1.105 0 4 36
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Table C.7 Summary Statistics for HDP Supporters
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
EU Referendum Vote Choice 0.851 0.36 0 1 47
Pro EU Attitudes 3.965 0.673 2.333 5 49
EU Policy Support 8.295 1.7 2.333 10 49
IAT Score 0.117 0.463 -0.738 1.118 49
Legitimacy 3.633 0.847 1.333 5 49
Permeability 3.095 1.097 1 4.667 49
National Identity 2.116 0.690 1 4 49
Political Ideology 1.688 1.339 0 5 48
Gender(Female) 0.49 0.505 0 1 49
Age 23.429 2.062 19 28 49
Income 11.327 2.593 1 15 49
Religiosity 1.429 1.414 0 4 49
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